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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Spreader Specialists, Inc. (referred to 
hereinafter as Petitioner or Spreader Specialists) seeks review 
of a final order of the Public Service Commission of Utah deny-
ing Spreader Specialists' Petition for Reconsideration and 
Reversal of the Commission's earlier Report and Order in Case 
No. 84-663-01. The Commission denied Spreader Specialists' 
application for authority to operate as a common carrier by 
motor vehicle for the transportation of liquid petroleum and 
liquid petroleum products (except propane and butane), in bulk, 
in tank vehicles over irregular routes from and between all 
points and places in the state of Utah. (R. at 1570, 1695); 
(Copies of the Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration and 
Reversal and its Report and Order are attached hereto as 
Appendices "BM and "C," respectively). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Over 40 years ago, three interstate certificates of 
authority to transport petroleum and petroleum products were 
granted to three carriers. Subsequently, one certificate was 
split, resulting in the four base certificates which are now 
held by protestants. While those original certificates have 
been expanded, no additional common carriers have been allowed 
to enter the Utah intrastate petroleum transportation market. 
To keep up with the increased demand that has 
developed since the certificates were originally issued, 
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existing carriers have increasingly relied on leasing opera-
tions. It was under those circumstances that Spreader 
Specialists got its start in 1976. (R. at 62). 
Initially a one-man, one-truck asphalt transportation 
operation, Spreader Specialists grew steadily, adding both 
equipment and manpower to meet the demand of the marketplace. 
During its first eight years, Spreader Specialists operated 
under lease to various authorized common carriers both on an 
intrastate and interstate basis. (R. at 22). Notwithstanding 
the fact that it was operating under lease to other certifi-
cated carriers, Spreader Specialists developed its own identity 
and a reputation for dependable service and safe operations. 
Spreader Specialists now enjoys a loyal customer base and 
expanding clientele. Indeed, a common factor brought out by 
the testimony during the hearing on petitioner's application, 
and one which was never challenged by the protestants, was the 
exceptional service provided in the past by Spreader 
Specialists. (R. at 163-64). 
At the time of the hearing, Spreader Specialists 
maintained a fleet of twenty-two tankers trucks and trailers; 
all but two truck and trailer combinations are insulated for 
use in transporting liquid asphalt and crude petroleum. The 
remaining trucks and trailers are equipped with bottom loading 
and vapor recovery systems to allow for transportation of 
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refined petroleum products. All of the trucks are equipped 
with the most modern safety equipment. Spreader Specialists* 
fleet of nine asphalt spreading trucks is the most modern among 
the common carriers in the state and represents approximately 
one-third of the asphalt spreader trucks available from common 
carriers in the State of Utah. (R. at 21-33). 
In 1983, Pacific Intermountain Express (MPIEH), the 
carrier under whose authority Spreader Specialists had operated 
for several years, transferred its bulk tank division and its 
intrastate authority to transport petroleum and petroleum 
products to protestant Matlack, Inc., ("Matlack"), a large 
eastern trucking company involved mainly in the transportation 
of chemical products. The relationship between Spreader 
Specialists and Matlack was patterned initially on the rela-
tionship Spreader Specialists had enjoyed with PIE. However, 
the working relationship between the companies deteriorated, 
marked by Matlack's lack of knowledge about the petroleum 
transportation industry in the intermountain west, as well as 
by a substantial increase in the percentage of revenue retained 
by Matlack under the lease agreement. (R. at 22-23, 268-69). 
Additionally, Matlack discontinued holding safety meetings with 
its lease operators, including Spreader Specialists, and 
created numerous billing problems with customers. Matlack also 
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shifted more of the terminal responsibilities to Spreader 
Specialists until the relationship was basically one of 
Spreader Specialists leasing authority from Matlack, rather 
than Matlack leasing equipment and drivers from Spreader 
Specialists. (R. at 48, 303, 1222-23). Indeed, Spreader 
Specialists not only arranged hauls for its own equipment, but 
it also lined up hauls and jobs for the few pieces of asphalt 
spreaders owned and operated by Matlack. (R. at 207). 
In order to continue providing professional service 
the management of Spreader Specialists came to the conclusion 
that it could no longer continue under its indenture to 
Matlack. Therefore, during the early months of 1984, Spreader 
Specialists filed applications with the Idaho and Utah Public 
Service Commissions seeking intrastate authority to transport 
liquid petroleum and petroleum products within those states. 
Spreader Specialists also filed an application with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to provide the same service between 
all points and places in the fourteen western states. The 
requested authority was granted from the Interstate Commerce 
Commission on June 4, 1984 and from the State of Idaho on 
July 12, 1984. (R. at 1479). Spreader Specialists1 Utah 
application, however, met with protests from the four 
authorized carriers, namely Clark Tank Lines ("Clark"), W. S. 
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Hatch Company (HHatchH), Matlack and Energy Express. (R. at 
1370, 1375, 1378, 1384). 
At the hearing commenced on July 16, 1984, sixteen 
shippers testified in support of the application of Spreader 
Specialists. The shippers' testimony evidenced a pattern of 
service failures by the protesting carriers, actual and 
projected increases in the need for common carrier service and 
substantial benefits which would result from a grant of the 
requested authority. The protesting carriers relied solely on 
the self-serving testimony of their operating officers to 
refute the presentation of Spreader Specialists. 
Subsequent to the hearing, but prior to the submission 
of post-hearing briefs, the Utah Supreme Court issued its 
opinion in Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 
infra. 
Briefs were submitted by the parties on October 4, 
1984 and the Commission issued its Report and Order on 
April 12, 1985. It found petitioner financially and operation-
ally fit, but denied the authority because the financial condi-
tion of the protesting carriers was such that entry of an 
additional carrier would cause them financial harm and could 
not be justified by any benefits which might be realized. (R. 
at 1506). 
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A Petition for Reconsideration and Reversal filed with 
the Commission on May 2, 1985, was denied on November 5, 1985. 
However, the Commission specifically invited this Court to give 
direction on the issues raised by this case. (R. at 1695). 
Spreader Specialists thereafter filed its Petition for Review 
with this Court. (R. at 1699). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
While deregulation of public transportation has swept 
across the country, little has changed in Utah's tightly 
regulated trucking industry. Regulation, once erected to 
protect the shipping public, has now become a barrier to 
improving transportation services. The Public Service Commis-
sion's narrow construction of this Court's decision in Big K 
Corp. makes it virtually impossible for a new entrant to obtain 
operating authority. 
Big K. Corp. rejected the old approach to public 
convenience and necessity and emphasized the need to focus on 
the benefits that flow from competition. Notwithstanding the 
Court's decision in Big K, and the overwhelming need for addi-
tional service established in the hearing, the Commission 
focused on the incredibly unlikely harm the protesting carriers 
might suffer if Spreader Specialists were granted authority. 
In so holding, the Commission erroneously disregarded the fact 
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that Spreader Specialists, as a lessor, is and already 
providing service and already stands in competition with 
protestants. The Commission also erred as a matter of law by 
concluding that potential diversionary harm to protestants was 
too great to justify granting the authority without first 
making a finding that protestants are efficiently operated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD ARTICULATED IN BIG K FAVORS 
ENTRY OF NEW CARRIERS WHERE PUBLIC CONVENI-
ENCE AND NECESSITY WILL BE BENEFITED. 
This Court and the Commission requires that an 
applicant seeking authority to operate as a common carrier must 
make a showing of financial, regulatory and operational fitness 
before it can obtain a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity. In the Matter of the Application of Big K Corpora-
tion, Case No. 81-439-01 (June 14, 1982), rev'd and remanded on 
other grounds. Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 689 
P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984); Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5 (1953). In this 
case, the Commission explicitly concluded that Spreader 
Specialists satisfied the requirements of financial, regulatory 
and operational fitness. Its error was finding that public 
necessity and convenience would not be served by a grant of the 
authority to Petitioner. 
In 1984, this Court reviewed the standard to be 
applied for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience 
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and necessity to a new motor carrier. In Big K, the Commis-
sion's order denying a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity to Big K Corporation was reversed and the case 
remanded for clarification of the appropriate standard to be 
applied when determining public need in transportation cases. 
Citing Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983), the Court 
noted that it generally will not defer to the Commission on 
issues of law. We asked the Court to exercise its legal 
prerogatives in the present case where the issues are the same 
under the Big K case. 
Referring to Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5 (1953), the Court 
in Big K Corp. emphasized the responsibility of the Commission 
to authorize new service when it finds that Hthe public 
convenience and necessity require the proposed service or any 
part thereof." id. at 1356. The Court defined "necessity" as 
meaning "reasonably necessary and not absolutely imperative," 
and stated further that "[a]ny service or improvement which is 
desirable for the public welfare and highly important to the 
public convenience may properly be regarded as necessary." Id. 
at 1354. "[A] service is not necessarily adequate because [a] 
community can 'get by,• can conduct its business without 
further or additional service." Mulcahy v. Public Service 
Commission, 101 Utah 2d 245, 252, 117 P.2d 298, 301 (1941). 
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Factors to be considered by the Commission when determining 
whether the public interest and necessity would be served by 
additional service include among others: 
The benefits to be derived from increased 
competition/ such as the potential benefi-
cial effect upon rates, customer service, 
the acquisition of equipment, greater 
responsiveness in meeting future shipper 
needs, and greater efficiency in the use of 
route structures and interlining arrange-
ments. (Citation omitted.) 
Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d at 1354. 
Big K Corp. dispels a growing notion that Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-6-1 £t seg., and the Court's earlier decisions inter-
preting that statute, require a finding by the Commission that 
existing motor carrier services must be wholly deficient before 
a new carrier will be granted authority. The Court rejected 
this interpretation by the Commission of its prior rulings and 
stated that Hdeficiencies in existing service" constitute but 
one factor among many which must be considered by the Commis-
sion when considering applications for new authority. The 
••ultimate criterion- against which all relevant factors are to 
be evaluated, according to the Court, is the "public good and 
convenience.N Id. at 1355. 
The limited protection from competitive forces 
originally extended to existing carriers has mistakenly and 
improperly been elevated to, and equated with, the concept of 
"public good and convenience." Historically, regulation of 
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transportation services was intended to insure reliable, 
uninterrupted service to communities at affordable prices and 
to prevent predatory, below-cost competition by large 
carriers. As carriers increased in size and number, large 
carriers would sometimes force smaller competitors out of a 
geographic market and then later either withdraw their services 
from that market, thereby severing the lifeline of commerce, or 
raise the price of service, thereby putting shippers at their 
mercy. 
Eventually, and due in large part to efforts by 
authorized carriers to protect their monopolistic positions, 
notions of public convenience and necessity were replaced by 
emphasis on market entry requirements designed to make market 
entry virtually impossible. The Big K Corp. opinion unmistak-
ably re-sets the proper course by declaring that the ultimate 
test in motor carrier applications to be the public good and 
convenience and "not the existing carriers' convenience and 
necessity." Id. at 1355; (Emphasis added). Competition, while 
fundamentally at odds with the interests of existing authorized 
carriers, "is almost always an affirmative factor in furthering 
the public convenience and necessity." Id. at 1354. In fact, 
the Court in Big K declared that the term "public convenience 
and necessity" should be construed to foster competition when-
ever feasible. Id. 
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A factor to be considered is the impact the grant of 
authority might have on protestants1 operations. While the 
Court in Bio K recognized that a legitimate factor to be 
considered is the effect the increased competition will have on 
existing carriers, that factor has bearing only to the extent 
that the existing carriers' ability to provide safe, reliable 
service is not undercut. I£. at 1354. The Court specifically 
rejected as a reason for denying an application the argument 
raised by protestants herein that the diversion of income will 
cause injury to the existing carriers. The Court declared: 
Nevertheless, the fact that additional 
competition will divert revenues from 
existing carriers is not a valid reason by 
itself to justify a denial of additional 
authority. 
The ultimate criterion against which 
all relevant factors are to be evaluated is 
the Hpublic good and convenience," (citation 
omitted) not the existing carriers' conveni-
ence and necessity. 
Id. at 1355; (Emphasis added). 
The Big K Corp. decision refocused the emphasis in 
certification proceedings on the public good and convenience 
and away from protection of existing carriers. This 
re-emphasis of the Court's policy was necessary in order to 
bring the Commission back in line with the basic purpose of the 
regulatory scheme, a purpose that had been skewed by existing 
carriers to provide financial protection to them at the expense 
of competition. 
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II. THE RECORD OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS A FINDING 
THAT THE BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM A GRANT 
OF AUTHORITY TO PETITIONER OUTWEIGH ANY 
ASSOCIATED DETRIMENTS AND THE COMMISSION'S 
CONCLUSIONS TO THE CONTRARY ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
A. There Exists a Deficiency in the Existing Service 
Available for the Transportation of Asphalt. 
Numerous private contractors, asphalt suppliers, city 
and county road departments, and state agencies testified 
during the hearing to the fact that there is and has been a 
substantial deficiency in the equipment available to meet their 
asphalt needs. There was substantial testimony that during the 
peak months of the asphalt season, beginning in late May and 
continuing through September, there is an insufficient number 
of asphalt spreaders available within the state to meet the 
needs of the public. Several shippers testified that there are 
also deficiencies in the existing service in the transportation 
of asphalt to and from storage sites and other points where 
asphalt is used or stored. Dissatisfaction, to the point of 
refusal by the shipper to call upon the protesting carriers, 
was also expressed by testifying shippers. 
Specifically, the representative for District 5 of the 
Utah Department of Transportation testified that on an annual 
basis he has difficulties obtaining asphalt spreading equipment 
and qualified drivers, with the problem becoming more acute in 
the future because of the closure of Arizona Refinery. In his 
opinion there was a definite need for more qualified spreader 
drivers and spreader equipped trucks. (R. at 131, 141). 
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Likewise, the Regional Manager for Koch Asphalt 
indicated that 95% of its asphalt transportation needs are met 
by common carrier, that there has been a deficiency in the 
transportation services available to him and that in his 
opinion there is an inadequate supply of asphalt transportation 
equipment available in the State of Utah. (R. at 158, 160 and 
162). 
The Transportation Manager for Staker Paving & Con-
struction, Inc., one of the largest private contractors in the 
state, testified that each year there is a shortage of asphalt 
equipment and that he experiences problems obtaining service 
from all of the common carriers presently authorized to operate 
in the State of Utah. (R. at 203-4). Staker Paving asserted 
that there is Ma big need" for an additional authorized carrier 
and feels that "there is not enough equipment available to meet 
the needs." (R. p. 209, 221). 
Another large contractor involved in the asphalt 
industry is Jack B. Parson Companies, with asphalt plants in 
Ogden, Brigham City and Smithfield, Utah, testified through its 
representative that because of the inability of the protesting 
carriers to provide service in the past, it has relied solely 
on the services of Spreader Specialists during 1983 and 1982. 
(R. at 323, 331-32). He also testified that on both occasions 
in 1984 when he was forced to call Clark, it failed to provide 
adequate service. 
-14-
Fife Rock Products Co., Inc. presented testimony 
through its asphalt road foreman which indicated that in 1983, 
protestant Clark was unable to provide service when called upon 
and that it relied on the service of Spreader Specialists for 
its asphalt transportation needs. (R. at 354-56). 
Dell Maxwell testified on behalf of Asphalt Systems, 
Inc. and stated that although many of its transportation needs 
have been met by Spreader Specialists in the past, it also 
utilizes Clark for the delivery of Naptha to its facility. 
Although Clark is generally able to provide a truck, it ~s late 
approximately 80% of the time. (R. at 373). According to Mr. 
Maxwell, this causes substantial problems for his operations 
because of the product mixing sequence required in order to 
manufacture the finished product marketed by Asphalt Systems, 
Inc. (R. at 373-75). Mr. Maxwell no longer utilizes the 
service of protestant Hatch because of service failures in the 
past and dissatisfaction with their transportation service. 
(R. at 375-77). 
A representative of Logan City also appeared in 
support of the application and indicated that in over four 
years of supervising the Logan City Maintenance Department he 
had never been contacted by any representatives of the four 
protesting carriers until a few days prior to the hearing on 
this application when he was contacted by a representative of 
Clark. (R. at 537). According to Logan City, there is a need 
for an additional authorized carrier in the State of Utah. (R. 
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at 543). Logan City has been totally reliant on the services 
of Spreader Specialists since none of the other carriers have 
demonstrated any interest in serving the northern Utah 
community. 
Mr. Robert Wheadon appeared in his capacity as the 
State Maintenance Engineer for the Department of Transportation 
for the State of Utah. Mr. Wheadon and the State of Utah 
supported the application insofar as it would provide another 
authorized and qualified carrier to provide assistance in the 
transportation and spreading of asphalt. (R. at 561). Mr. 
Wheadon testified that the Department of Transportation did not 
anticipate purchases of asphalt spreading or transporting 
equipment and that even though each maintenance district has 
its own spreader equipped truck, they are small and rarely 
used. (R. at 558-59). Mr. Wheadon also indicated that in the 
estimation of the State Department of Transportation there is a 
substantial inadequacy of equipment available to serve the 
asphalt industry as it presently stands in the state and as it 
is contemplated in the immediate future. (R. at 562). 
Similar testimony was offered by the Box Elder County 
Road Department. During the past two years, Box Elder County 
has had difficulty obtaining spreader equipment on several 
occasions. (R. at 610). The County Road Department has 
refused to use protestant Clark's service during the two years 
prior to the hearing because of prior dissatisfaction. (R. at 
609). 
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Entities unable to appear at the hearing but which 
supported the application by submitting shipper support state-
ments include Weber County, Emery County, Duchesne County, 
Cache County, Asphalt Supply & Service, Asphalt Paving Corp., 
Trumbull Asphalt, LeGrand Johnson Construction Company and 
Intermountain Oil Company. These support statements indicate 
that additional transportation services are needed, that there 
is not enough equipment available and that the quality of 
Spreader Specialists* services surpass the service avabilable 
from the other carriers. 
An examination of the record and the support state-
ments on file with the Commission clearly indicates a defi-
ciency in the existing services available to the public for the 
transportation and spreading of asphalt. The deficiencies 
attested to by the numerous witnesses exist notwithstanding the 
fact that Spreader Specialists is and has been providing 
service to a large segment of the market through its leasing 
arrangements. 
B. There Exists a Deficiency in the Existing Service 
Available for the Transportation of Crude Petroleum. 
Three supporting shippers appeared on behalf of 
Spreader Specialists' application to transport crude petroleum; 
namely, Chevron, U.S.A. ("Chevron"), American Oil Company 
("Amoco"), and Geokinetics, Inc. ("Geokinetics"). 
Larry Mouton, Transportation Manager for Amoco, 
testified that the transportation services presently available 
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to Amoco within the State of Utah are inadequate and unaccept-
able. (R. at 634). Mr. Mouton testified that on numerous 
occasions during 1984 each of the protesting carriers refused 
to transport loads of crude oil from the Amoco serviced well 
sites to the refinery in Salt Lake City. (R. at 635-44). 
Amoco, as a matter of policy, typically does not support appli-
cations of common carriers, but the service available in Utah 
had deteriorated to such a point that Amoco decided it had to 
do something to insure that it would have common carriers 
available to enable it to meet its commitments to transport 
crude oil. (R. at 634). Mr. Mouton indicated he is frequently 
unable to get trucks. (R. at 635). 
While it would be repetitous to recite each of the 
common carrier service failures experienced by Amoco, one 
example is indicative of the deficiency in the existing 
service. Shortly after one close call whereby protestant 
Clark's late arrival almost resulted in the shut down of an oil 
well, Clark agreed to transport four loads of crude oil from a 
well site in Utah to Amoco*s refinery. Without informing 
anyone at Amoco that it would be unable to provide that 
service, Clark failed to move the oil as agreed from the 
storage tanks at the well site resulting in the well being shut 
in. Mr. Mouton testified about numerous other occasions 
!This not only cost the producer upwards of $350,000 in 
lost revenue plus additional costs of startup, but also 
resulted in serious damage to customer relations between Amoco 
and that particular producer. (R. at 638; Exh. 23). 
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where Clark had either been unable to provide transportation 
service or the service provided had been unacceptable with 
regard both to timeliness and spills of product. (R. at Vol. 
3, pp. 636, 637, 647, 648, 653, 654). 
Likewise, protestant Hatch failed to provide adequate 
service to Amoco. (R. at 639-40). Mr. Mouton testified that 
Hatch repeatedly turned down loads of crude petroleum. (R. at 
640). 
Despite Matlack's efforts to provide Amoco with 
service, it also turned down loads of crude oil because of 
unavailability of equipment and drivers. (R. at 649-50). 
The protestants attempted to paint Mr. Mouton as an 
unreasonable man with unreasonable expectations. However, as 
Mr. Mouton testified, he is not able to control the flow of 
crude oil or regulate the amount of on-site storage available. 
(R. at 650, 1218). It should be remembered that it is Amoco 
that is dissatisfied with existing service, not just Mr. Mouton 
personally. Protestants cannot eliminate the tough customer 
from the market place for purposes of assessing market condi-
tions; after all, the customer justifies their existence. 
Chevron also appeared in support of the crude oil 
portion of Spreader Specialists' application. Mr. Al Taylor, 
Regional Transportation Manager for Chevron, testified that the 
transportation services provided by common carriers in the 
State of Utah as compared to other western states is "below 
average." (R. at 492). Chevron determined that it was in its 
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best interest to support the application because of the service 
problems it has experienced both with respect to crude 
petroleum and refined products in Utah during the six months 
preceding the hearing. (R. at 491). Jim Rich/ the person 
within the Chevron organization responsible for coordinating 
the transportation of crude petroleum within the state, 
testified that he has difficulty during the months from 
September through May getting equipment to transport crude 
petroleum from the Uintah Basin to the refineries in the Salt 
Lake City/Woodscross area. (R. at 510). Mr. Rich indicated 
that on numerous occasions during the months from September to 
May he has called each of the carriers and been unable to get 
equipment when needed. (R. at 511). He indicated that the 
problem is not related to any one carrier, but is general to 
all authorized common carriers presently available. In Mr. 
Rich's opinion, there is a need for additional equipment in the 
State of Utah. On cross-examination Mr. Rich did indicate that 
the efforts and cooperation of the existing carriers has been 
excellent, but maintained that notwithstanding such cooperation 
Chevron still has difficulty obtaining the necessary services. 
(R. at 526). The protestants attempted to limit Mr. Rich's 
needs for an additional carrier to an occasional difficulty 
during short-term seasonal peaks. However, Mr. Rich's final 
statement after direct, cross and redirect examination was that 
despite the existing carrier's efforts to provide service there 
still exists a deficiency in the service available. 
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C. There Exists a Deficiency in the Existing Service 
Available for the Transportation of Refined Petroleum Products. 
The commodities falling under this broad category 
include such petroleum products as gasolines, diesel fuel, jet 
fuel, aviation fuel and burner fuel. Key supporting shippers 
for these commodities were again Chevron and Amoco. Chevron 
has been hampered by numerous late deliveries and tardy 
pick-ups of refined product by the protesting carriers. 
(Exhs. 18-20). Likewise, there was testimony as to a number of 
instances where the protesting carriers have turned down ship-
ments tendered to them by Chevron. In fact, because of the 
extremely poor service by Energy Express, Chevron withdrew its 
volume tender arrangement from Energy Express in February of 
1984, and is hesitant to tender even single loads to it now 
because of a complete lack of confidence in Energy Express1 
drivers. (R. at 1175). 
A key service failure highlighted by Chevron was the 
fact that despite numerous requests by Chevron, the protesting 
carriers continually sent improperly trained and inexperienced 
drivers to the loading facility. (R. at 1176). Mr. Snider 
indicated that all of these problems are simply representative 
of the lack of service presently provided by existing 
carriers. (R. at 420). Chevron maintains that the level of 
service presently provided by common carriers is unacceptable 
and is of the opinion that there is a need for an additional 
carrier in Utah for the transportation of refined products. 
(R. at 434). 
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Amoco also expressed dissatisfaction with the service 
it has received from the protesting carriers with respect to 
the transportation of refined petroleum products. For example/ 
Energy Express failed on one occasion to transport diesel fuel 
to a well site in a timely fashion, forcing a shut down of the 
well and causing Amoco to lose a very substantial customer. 
(R. at 628). Because of service failures of Energy Express, 
Amoco no longer uses their services except where required by 
government contract to use a minority carrier. (R. at 630). 
Management for Energy Express indicated to Amoco in 1984 that 
they did not have enough equipment available to meet its 
needs. (R. at 641). 
Clearly, the record supports a finding that, contrary 
to the Commission's erroneous conclusion, there is indeed a 
deficiency in the existing service presently available to the 
public with respect to the transportation of asphalt, crude oil 
and refined petroleum products. 
D. The Projected Growth in the Utah Asphalt Industry 
Justifies the Granting of a Certificate to Spreader Specialists. 
Perhaps the greatest anticipated increase in the need 
for common carrier service for asphalt transportation was 
voiced by Staker Paving. In 1983, Staker Paving utilized 
approximately 600,000 tons of asphalt. It was anticipated that 
in 1984, the year of the hearing on Spreader Specialists' 
application, Staker Paving would utilize over 1,000,000 tons of 
asphalt and perhaps even more in 1985. (R. at 199). According 
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to Rod Thurston, transportation manager for Staker Paving, the 
asphalt paving business in the future will be Hcrazy." (R. at 
200). In order to meet the increased demand, Staker Paving 
changed to an around-the-clock operation. (R. at 201). All of 
the increase in asphalt transportation incurred by Staker 
Paving will be tendered to common carriers. (R. at 201). 
The representative of Jack B. Parson Companies testi-
fied that they anticipated an increase of between 25% to 50% 
for 1984 and hoped that the increase would also carry over into 
1985. That entire increase was to be handled by common 
carrier. (R. at 325). 
Fife Rock Products' representative testified that in 
his experience and opinion there was more activity in the 
asphalt maintenance industry in 1984 than in 1983. (R. at 
355). Koch Asphalt indicated that it anticipates an increase 
in its need for common carrier service. (R. at 174). Logan 
City plans to increase their asphalt program by one-third for 
1984 and 1985. (R. at 535). 
Significant testimony as to projected increases in the 
asphalt maintenance work conducted by the Department of Trans-
portation for the State of Utah was given by Mr. Robert 
Wheadon. Mr. Wheadon indicated that there has been in the past 
a tendency to neglect state roads and highways in favor 
directing funds to the interstate highway system. With the 
interstate system substantially in place, highway funds are 
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being diverted again to state highways which are in consider-
able need of repair and maintenance. As a result, Mr. Wheadon, 
forecasted a 10% to 15% increase in the transportation of 
asphalt to state job sites during 1984 and a 25% to 35% 
increase for each of the next three or four years. (R. at 
564). According to Mr. Wheadon the State of Utah is planning 
on a very definite increase in the asphalt maintenance work 
done by the state, which increase will be met through utiliza-
tion of common carrier service. (R. at 560). 
E. The Projected Increases in the Production and 
Transportation of Crude Oil Justify Granting Spreader 
Specialists' Application. 
In addition to the testimony rendered with respect to 
increases in the asphalt industry, each of the witnesses 
supporting transportation of crude oil also indicated that 
there are substantial increases projected for the production of 
crude petroleum. Specifically, Chevron anticipated an 8% 
increase in production in 1985 as well as an 8% increase in 
1986. All of the increased volume was to be tendered to common 
carriers. (R. at 508). 
Amoco similarly anticipated increases in production. 
(R. at 625-26). Although Mr. Mouton did not quantify the 
percentage of increase anticipated, he indicated that several 
new high producing wells located in Utah will soon be on line 
and that all of the production coming out of those wells would 
be tendered to common carriers for transportation to the Amoco 
refinery. (R. at 625). 
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Geokinetics also forecasts substantial increases in 
its production of crude shale oil. Current production is at 
approximately 200 barrels a day. A processing plant was under 
construction at the time of the hearing which will enable 
Geokinetics to increase its production to 1,000 barrels a day 
by 1985. (R. at 474). Geokinetics anticipates the construc-
tion of additional plants which would further increase their 
production capability, and thus, their need for common carrier 
service. (R. at 475). 
F. The Projected Increases in the Need for Trans-
portation of Refined Petroleum Products Justifies Granting 
Spreader Specialists' Application. 
Finally, there was also substantial testimony concern-
ing the anticipated increases in the transportation of refined 
petroleum products. Chevron anticipated an increase of 
approximately 7% in the volume of refined products shipped out 
of the Salt Lake refinery to Utah locations in 1985. (R. at 
407). The entire 7% increase was to be tendered to common 
carriers. (R. at Vol. 2, p. 99). In addition to the 7% 
increase in volume, Chevron indicated that it had permanently 
eliminated two proprietary driver positions, thereby decreasing 
their proprietary fleet capacity and resulting in an even 
larger increase in the volume tendered to common carrier. (R. 
at 407). The reduction in drivers resulted in an annual shift 
of some 4,000,000 gallons of refined petroleum to Utah common 
carriers. (R. at 407-9). In 1984, Chevron anticipated 
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tendering an additional 1,485 loads of refined petroleum to 
common carriers, bringing the total to some 9,000 loads of 
refined petroleum transported for Chevron by common carrier on 
an annual basis. (Bxh. 17). 
Amoco also anticipated growth in their refined product 
group. Any increase in the amount of refined products shipped 
by Amoco would have necessarily been be transported by common 
carrier because of the fact that Amoco's proprietary fleet was 
already operating at capacity. (R. at 625). 
Spreader Specialists' own expansion is indeed indica-
tive of a growing demand. Spreader Specialists has grown from 
a one-truck, one-man operation in 1976 to a full scale, 
independently recognized operation. This growth has been in 
response to substantial increases in market demand. Spreader 
Specialists has not been alone in its growth. Although 
reluctant to admit it, Hatch and Clark made several equipment 
acquisitions because of increased demand around the time of the 
hearing, notwithstanding their representations that they have 
idle equipment. (R. at 884, 1085). 
III. ANY DETRIMENT WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM A 
GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO SPREADER SPECIALISTS 
WOULD BE MINIMAL AND WOULD AFFECT ONLY 
PROTESTANTS AND NOT THE PUBLIC. , 
The Commission is directed by statute not to grant a 
certificate of convenience and necessity if it finds that to do 
so would "be detrimental to the best interests of the people of 
the State of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5. Protestants* 
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presentations to the Commission were based on the inaccurate 
premise that mere economic loss to an existing carrier consti-
tutes detriment to the people of the State of Utah. This Court 
has held that "the fact that additional competition will divert 
revenues from existing carriers is not a valid reason by itself 
to justify a denial of additional authority.H Big K Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d at 1355. While the Commis-
sion may consider the economic impact of a new entrant on 
existing carriers insofar as it impairs the safety of the 
public or the carriers' ability to provide reliable service, 
the testimony of the protestants, without exception, was that 
they are safety conscious and reliable, and intend to remain so. 
Protestants presented company representatives who 
testified that if Spreader Specialists is granted authority, 
the result will be financial ruin for their organization. 
Applicant can only consider these outrageous estimations of its 
ability to divert business away from the existing carriers as 
either a compliment to the service performed by Spreader 
Specialists, or, more realistically, as a groundless statement 
advanced to protect protestants' positions as monopolies. 
The fact that Spreader Specialists was already 
operating at full capacity under lease during the asphalt 
season at all times relevant here, and thus already enjoyed a 
substantial market share, requires that protestants' "diversion 
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of business" argument be looked at in a different context from 
that which would apply in the case of a new entrant. It is not 
the case that Spreader Specialists will be entering the market 
for the first time, thereby threatening existing market shares; 
Spreader Specialists already controls a significant share of 
the market and simply seeks the right to continue to service 
those customers requesting assistance without having to line 
the pockets of some broker. 
Numerous supporting witnesses testified that Spreader 
Specialists is the only carrier providing the services needed 
by them, although they acknowledge that it has done so under 
the authority of other carriers. Shippers identify with the 
company providing the service, not with the holder of the 
certificate. Unfortunately, to operate independently of 
existing carriers one must obtain a certificate; a task which 
has become nearly impossible in Utah. Whether Spreader 
Specialists operates under lease to Matlack or to any other 
authorized carrier, it is safe to assume that a majority of its 
customers would continue to call it regardless of the authority 
under which they operate. Thus, if Spreader Specialists were 
granted the authority to operate on its own, and assuming that 
Spreader Specialists maintains a substantial portion of the 
market it has already captured, there would be no basic diver-
sion of customer accounts away from Clark, Energy Express or 
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Hatch. If diversion does occur, it will be because of customer 
preference and service, not merely because of the presence of a 
new carrier. The possibility of diversion in this form exists 
currently and will continue to be an economic force as long as 
Spreader Specialists operates. 
The possibility of diversion away from Matlack is 
slightly different, but not nearly as significant as portrayed 
by Matlack. At worst Matlack would be losing only 13 percent 
of the revenue derived from the transportation of petroleum 
2 
products by Spreader Specialists. (R. at 777). Ac:ording 
to Matlack's operating witness, it might be in Matlack's best 
interest if Spreader Specialists obtained its own authority, 
since he maintained that almost all of the revenue retained by 
Matlack under the Spreader Specialists' lease is used to pay 
the costs associated with the lease arrangement. (R. at 781). 
In any event, the possible diver- sion away from Matlack would 
not seriously threaten the finan- cial stability of a company 
with over $28,000,000 in retained earnings in 1983. (R. at 
738). 
An examination of Exhibits 76 and 77 utilized at the 
hearing to show the potential diversion of income away from the 
2At present 100 percent of the spreading income is passed 
on to Spreader Specialists. (R. at 779). 
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protestants to Spreader Specialists is very revealing. 
(Appendices *DM and "E" hereto, respectively). Exhibit 76 is 
based on the assumption of a zero percent increase in revenue 
for 1984 for the entire applicable market. In order for 
Spreader Specialists to achieve its very optimistic revenue 
goal for 1984, it would need to divert only 1.78 percent of 
each of the protestantfs gross revenue to its own gross 
receipts. In terms of dollars Spreader Specialists would only 
be diverting $42,917 away from Clark which enjoyed intrastate 
revenue of $2,738,132 for 1983; $38,213 away from Energy 
Express which enjoyed intrastate revenue of $2,142,614 for 
1983; $45,709 away from Matlack which enjoyed intrastate 
revenue of $2,700,000 for 1983; and $19,989 away from Hatch 
which enjoyed intrastate revenue of $7,488,647 for 1983. 
(Appendix W D H ) . That percentage and those dollar figures would 
be even less if the diversion of income is spread across the 
entire petroleum transportation industry in Utah or if the 
total revenue is increased proportionately. Exhibit 77 is a 
diversion projection based on an assumption of a conservative 5 
percent market increase to be enjoyed equally by each of the 
protesting carriers and the Petitioner. Given that market 
growth, only 1.4 percent of each of the protestanfs gross 
revenue would have to be diverted by Spreader Specialists in 
order to reach its generous revenue projection for 1984. 
Again, the percentage diverted from each of the protestants 
would decrease if the diversionary effect were spread across 
the industry to proprietary fleets as well. 
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Although in fiscal year 1984, Spreader Specialists' 
gross revenue, intrastate and interstate, was only $1 million, 
protestants allege that Spreader Specialists, if granted the 
authority, would be able to divert some $8 million in revenues 
away from them. (Exh. 76). Spreader Specialists simply does 
not have the equipment, the manpower or the financial capital 
to divert the magnitude of income away from protestants as they 
have represented. The argument to the contrary is totally 
speculative and it was error for the Commission to so conclude. 
As borne out by the testimony of numerous witnesses, 
Spreader Specialists has, under the lease operations, already 
diverted some business away from the existing carriers. The 
reason for such diversion as testified to has been on the basis 
of service: either poor service by the protestants or good 
service by Spreader Specialists. If the entry of Spreader 
Specialists into the market as an authorized carrier will 
somehow force the existing carriers to operate more efficiently 
and provide better service to the public, then the basic goal 
of the Commission as mandated by statute and the Utah Supreme 
Court to provide better service to the public will have been 
well served. 
The protestants presented absolutely no credible 
evidence that the granting of authority to Spreader Specialists 
will cause them real economic harm or prevent them from 
providing safe, reliable service. 
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IV. WHERE A GRANT OF NEW AUTHORITY BENEFITS THE 
PUBLIC, PROTESTING CARRIERS HAVE THE BURDEN 
OF SHOWING THEY WILL BE PREVENTED FROM 
PROVIDING SAFE, RELIABLE SERVICE AND FROM 
COMPLYING WITH MOTOR CARRIER REGULATIONS. 
Once an applicant establishes that the public will 
benefit from a grant of the requested authority, the burden 
should shift to the protesting parties to show that the public 
convenience and necessity would not be best served by granting 
the application. It is clear from the Commission's Report and 
Order denying authority herein that little consideration was 
given to the numerous benefits to be derived from a grant of 
authority. Rather, the application was denied because of the 
imagined impact the additional competition might have on 
existing carriers. 
The initial focus of the Supreme Court in Big K Corp. 
was on the benefits to be derived from competition. The Court 
then balanced those benefits against the existing carriers' 
ability to provide safe, reliable service. While the Court 
noted that the impact additional competition might have on 
existing carriers may not be wholly disregarded, it carefully 
restricted the scope of review regarding that impact. The 
Court cautioned the Commission not to undercut the ability of 
efficiently operated carriers to achieve sufficient financial 
stability so that they can (1) provide reliable service, (2) 
comply with public safety regulations, and (3) conform with 
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other business regulatory policies that further economic 
development and growth of new industries. Ifi. at 1354. As 
long as existing carriers cannot continue to provide reliable 
service and comply with safety and business regulations, the 
benefits of competition will tip the scales in favor of the new 
carrier. On the other hand, if protesting carriers can meet 
their burden of proof by showing through competent evidence 
that they are efficiently operated and that, despite their good 
management, they will be impaired to the point of being unable 
to perform safely and reliably, then the requested authority 
should probably, although not necessarily, be denied. 
The Commission has no duty to protect the operations 
of an inefficiently operated carrier. Indeed, for the public 
good, it should not protect such a carrier. A new carrier 
should not be denied the opportunity to provide better service 
because of another carrier's inefficiencies. 
The primary argument for denying authority raised by 
protesting carriers in motor carrier cases is that the 
protesting carriers would be injured by a diversion of income, 
an argument flatly rejected in Big K Corp. Id. at 1355. 
Citing the United States Supreme Court in Schaffer Transporta-
tion Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 91 (1957), the Utah 
Supreme Court in Big K Corp. stated: 
[N]o carrier is entitled to protection from 
competition in the continuance of a service 
that fails to meet the public need, nor, by 
the same token, should the public be 
deprived of a new and improved service 
because it may divert some traffic from 
other carriers. 
689 P.2d at 1354. 
-33-
To satisfy their burden, the protesting carriers must 
do something more than simply allege economic loss. Initially 
they should be required to show that they are being efficiently 
operated. If it is apparent that there is room for improve-
ment, then that factor should be taken into consideration when 
evaluating the alleged harm to existing carriers. Next, they 
should be required to demonstrate, through competent evidence, 
that the financial harm to their operations would be so signi-
ficant that it would substantially impair their ability to 
continue operating, and if they continued to operate, their 
income from operations would be so reduced that they could not 
meet safety requirements or pay for the filing fees for annual 
reports. 
Although no such showings were made by any of the 
protesting carriers during the hearing, the Commission held 
that the potential financial danger to the protesting carriers 
3 
was too great to grant the application. It took this 
position even though Petitioner presented substantial evidence 
showing glaring inefficiencies in protestants' operations, the 
3Protestant Clark Tank Lines filed a petition under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code with the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Utah on February 7, 1986, and 
has given notice of its intent to transfer its Utah intrastate 
authority. The financial condition of Clark is the result of 
unchecked and uncontrolled inefficiencies in the face of 
increased revenues as evidenced by the reports to the Public 
Service Commission filed by the protestants for the years 
1982-1984. 
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most telling of which revolved around several of the protest-
ants' leasing arrangements with principals of the company 
whereby equipment was leased on long term leases and payments 
were made to the principals regardless of need. In this 
manner, the carriers are able to pass large portions of revenue 
on to principals of the company without showing it as income to 
4 
the company. It is impossible to tell from the reports 
filed by the protesting carriers what their actual financial 
condition is. 
The Commission erred as a matter of law by determining 
that protestants were efficiently operated before denying the 
application of Spreader Specialists on the grounds that the 
financial harm to the existing carriers would be too great. 
CONCLUSION 
As is the policy behind the Motor Carrier Act, the 
Utah regulatory scheme should be Hadministered with an eye to 
affirmatively improving transportation facilities, not merely 
to preserving existing arrangements. . . .H Big K Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d at 1354, quoting McLean 
Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 86 (1944). Peti-
tioner merely seeks the opportunity to play a part in improving 
4See Spreader Specialists Petition for Reconsideration 
and its Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Recon-
sideration and Reversal for a more detailed discussion of the 
misleading nature of protestants' leasing arrangement. (R. at 
1508, 1674). 
-35-
motor common carrier service in Utah, a role it has been forced 
to play up to now as an indentured servant. The forty year old 
monopoly for the transportation of liquid petroleum and 
products in Utah should now be broken in the public interest. 
That will require the reversal of the Commission's Order 
denying the application, and that the authority as requested be 
granted. ^ 
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BIG K CORP. v. PUE 
Cite a* 689 TJA 
as a guarantor, was liable for the loss of 
the trailer. See Prudential Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. St. Paul In-
surance Cos., 22 Utah 2d 70, 448 P.2d 724 
(1968) (Crockett, CJ., concurring specially), 
and Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 12 Utah 
2d 107, 363 P.2d 498 (1961) on "law of the 
case." 
The judgment below is affirmed and the 
case is remanded to determine a reasonable 
amount of attorney fees which Petty Motor 
is entitled to under its agreement for re-
sponding to this appeal. Costs on appeal 
are awarded to Petty Motor. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
BIG K CORPORATION, dba Diamond 
Transport, Plaintiff, 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; Brent H. Cameron, Chairman, 
David R. Irvine, Commissioner, and 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, De-
fendants. 
No. 18643. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 28, 1984. 
Public Service Commission denied ap-
plication for certificate of convenience and 
necessity to transport by motor common 
carrier fluids used in drilling oil wells, and 
applicant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that: (1) finding that exist-
ing service was adequate because no ship-
per was wholly deprived of service was 
based on an erroneous legal construction of 
the "deficiency of service" standard, and 
(2) it was error to strike testimony of petro-
leum engineer that more water haulers 
6*9 P 2d-30 
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were needed merely because it was elicited 
as result of a Commissioner's question. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Public Utilities «=>194 
Court accords ruling of Public Service 
Commission differing degrees of deference 
according to the nature of the issues re-
viewed in a proceeding on a petition for 
issuance of certificate of convenience and 
necessity. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5. 
2. Public Utilities «=»194 
With respect to factual issues, scope of 
review of ruling of Public Service Commis-
sion is whether the findings are supported 
by substantial evidence and the court will 
not reweigh conflicting evidence and deter-
mines only whether there is substantial 
evidence to support a finding. U.C.A.1953, 
54-0-5. 
3. Public Utilities G=>194 
In determining whether Public Service 
Commission correctly construed general 
principles of law, whether statutory or case 
law, a reviewing court generally does not 
defer to the Commission. U.C.A.1953, 54-
6-5. 
4. Public Utilities «=>194 
Even with respect to Public Service 
Commission's construction of its organic 
statute, a reviewing court will not defer 
unless the Commission by virtue of exper-
tise and experience is in a superior position 
to give effect to the regulator}' objectives 
to be achieved or the terms of the statute 
make clear that the Commission was in-
tended to have broad discretion in constru-
ing those terms. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5. 
5. Automobiles <3=»83 
In determining whether public interest 
and necessity are served by additional mo-
tor common carrier service, the Public Ser-
vice Commission must consider numerous 
factors and must weigh the benefits to be 
derived from increased competition, such as 
the potential beneficial effect on rates, cus-
tomer service, the acquisition of equipment 
more suitable to customer needs, the effi-
cient use of equipment, greater responsive-
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ness in meeting future shipper needs, and 
greater efficiency in the use of route struc-
tures and interlining arrangements. U.C. 
A.1953, 54-6-5. 
6. Carriers *=»8 
In ruling on application for certificate 
of convenience and necessity, the Public 
Service Commission may not wholly disre-
gard the effect that additional competition 
may have on existing carriers and must not 
undercut the ability of efficiently operated 
carriers to achieve sufficient financial sta-
bility so that they can provide reliable ser-
vice, comply with public safety regulations 
and conform with other business regula-
tory policies that further economic develop-
ment and growth of new industries. U.C. 
A.1953, 54-6-5. 
7. Carriers s=>8 
Fact that additional competition will 
divert revenues from existing carriers is 
not a valid reason by itself to justify denial 
of additional authority, i.e., certificate of 
convenience and necessity. U.C.A.1953, 
54-6-5. 
8. Public Utilities <&=»113 
Ultimate criterion against which all rel-
evant factors are evaluated in ruling on 
application for certificate of convenience 
and necessity is the public good and conve-
nience. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5. 
9. Carriers «=>8 
Except where market conditions re-
quire otherwise, such as where markets are 
too small to support an additional carrier or 
a new carrier seeks to "cream" a market to 
the detriment of other carriers or small 
shippers, competition is almost always an 
affirmative factor in furthering the public 
convenience and necessity. U.C.A.1953, 
54-6-5. 
10. Automobiles «=>78 
Construction of term "public conve-
nience and necessity" as meaning to foster 
competition, when feasible, is not inconsist-
ent with statute providing that Public Ser-
vice Commission should prevent unneces-
sary duplication of services between motor 
common carriers. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-4, 54-
6-5. 
11. Automobiles *»78 
Statute requiring Public Service Com-
mission to prevent unnecessary duplication 
of services between motor common carriers 
was not intended to freeze monopoly or 
tightly oligopolistic markets irrespective of 
the benefits that competition may provide 
and it is not the policy of that statute to 
favor automatically the fewest number of 
carriers possible in a given market and 
duplication of services is not "unneces-
sary" if competition will provide a better 
service or lower rates. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-
4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
12. Automobiles e»78 
Statute requiring Public Service Com-
mission to prevent unnecessary duplication 
of services between motor common carriers 
was intended to prevent the kind of preda-
tory, below-cost competition that threatens 
the adequacy of service and the soundness 
of the transportation industry. U.C.A. 
1953, 54-6-4. 
13. Automobiles <3=>83 
Requirement that applicant for motor 
common carrier certificate of convenience 
and necessity prove that additional service 
is consonant with the public convenience 
and necessity may be met by showing inad-
equacy of the current service or the need to 
fulfill increased future demand for motor 
carrier services. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5. 
14. Automobiles <$=>78 
Inadequacy of service by present mo-
tor carriers is a broader concept than sim-
ply the absence of service and the service 
may be inadequate, for purpose of issuing 
additional certificates of convenience and 
necessity, if it does not meet the reasonable 
needs of consignors or consignees and "in-
adequacy of service" encompasses both 
substandard service and service that is sub-
ject to improvement and inadequacy need 
not necessarily be established by evidence 
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of actual shipper dissatisfaction with exist- 19. Automobiles *=»&3 
ing carrier service. U.C.A.I953, 54-6-5. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
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15. Automobiles *»78 
Existing motor carrier service may be 
inadequate, so as to warrant additional cer-
tificates of convenience and necessity, sim-
ply by comparison with improvements of-
fered by the applicant's proposed service. 
U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5. 
16. Automobiles *=»83 
Public Service Commission's finding 
that existing service concerning transporta-
tion of fluids used in drilling oil wells was 
adequate because no shipper was wholly 
deprived of service was based on an error 
of law, requiring a reevaluation under the 
proper standard of evidence that service 
proposed by applicant for certificate of con-
venience and necessity would benefit those 
shippers located in the northern and south 
central regions of the state and that long 
hauls from terminals of existing carriers to 
the shippers result in less efficient service 
and greater expense for the shippers in an 
industry in which time is a matter of con-
siderable importance. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5. 
17. Automobiles e=»83 
It was error for Public Service Com-
mission, in ruling on application for certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity to trans-
port fluids used in drilling oil wells, to 
strike testimony of petroleum engineer 
that more water haulers were needed in 
Utah as opinion had an adequate founda-
tion arising from witness' experience and 
expertise in the industry and opinion was 
not objectionable on ground that witness 
gave it in response to a Commissioner's 
question. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5. 
18. Public Utilities <s=»167 
It is duty of Public Service Commission 
to see that relevant evidence is not ignored 
in an application for certificate of conve-
nience and necessity and the Commission, 
though it acts in a quasi-judicial function 
and must be impartial as between the par-
ties, need not take a passive stance in pro-
tecting the public interest. U.C.A.1953, 
54-6-5. 
Required finding, as predicate to 
granting of certificate of convenience and 
necessity, that the public convenience and 
necessity require the proposed motor com-
mon carrier service must necessarily in-
clude the possibility that granting of the 
application will be "detrimental to the best 
interests of the people of the State," within 
meaning of statute. U.C.A.1953, -54-6-5. 
Merlin 0. Baker, A. Robert Thorup, 
Irene Warr, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Stephen 
Lewis, C. Reed Brown, William S. Richards, 
Mark Boyle, Donald B. Holbrook, Elizabeth 
Haslam, Randall N. Skanchy, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The plaintiff, Big K Corporation dba Dia-
mond Transport, a motor common earner, 
applied to the Utah Public Service Commis-
sion for a certificate of convenience and 
necessity to transport fluids used in drilling 
wells for oil over irregular routes between 
points within the state of Utah, with the 
exception of Uintah and Duchesne Coun-
ties. The PSC denied the application, hold-
ing that Big K had failed to show that the 
service provided by existing carriers was 
deficient. On this appeal, Big K argues 
that the Commission misconstrued the "de-
ficiency of service" standard and therefore 
failed to determine whether Big K's pro-
posed service would provide a better ser-
vice to shippers in northern and central 
Utah than is provided by the existing carri-
ers. W7e hold that the Commission erred as 
a matter of law in its construction of the 
"deficiency of service" standard. 
I. 
Prior to its application to the Utah PSC, 
Big K had obtained authority from the 
Public Service Commission of Wyoming to 
transport drilling fluids between points 
within the state of Wyoming. Big K was 
also authorized by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to transport drilling 
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fluids between the states of Utah, Wyo-
ming, Colorado, and Idaho. 
Big K's application for intrastate authori-
ty in Utah was protested by eight drilling 
fluid carriers.1 Its proposal was to use one 
of its existing terminals in Evanston, Wyo-
ming, to service recently developed north-
eastern Utah oilfields located in the newly 
discovered and partially developed Over-
thrust Belt area, and it also proposed to 
open a new terminal in Holden, Utah, to 
service new drilling activity in central 
Utah. The terminals of all but one of the 
protestants are located near Vernal in prox-
imity to the eastern Utah oil fields, which 
are old, established areas of oil exploration 
and production.2 Those fields are separat-
ed from the northeastern areas by the Uin-
tah Mountains. Land transportation be-
tween Vernal and the latter fields is long 
and round-about. 
Big K operates a fleet of thirty-one 
trucks for hauling drilling fluids. Drilling 
activity has increased in Utah significantly 
over the past twenty years. From 1976 to 
1981, drilling activity increased statewide 
some 165^. The Commission found that 
drilling activity would likely continue to 
increase in the future because of the dis-
coveries in the Overthrust Belt which is 
thought to extend the length of the state. 
The Overthrust Belt is one of the major oil 
discoveries in the continental United States 
during the past several decades. 
In support of its application, Big K ad-
duced the testimony of six shippers who 
supported the proposed service. Three oil 
drillers who operated in areas distant from 
Vernal testified that the long distances the 
drilling fluids were hauled had caused them 
delays, increased their expenses, and com-
pounded the problems of adequate water 
service. Big K also adduced evidence that 
oil drilling in Utah had increased consist-
ently over the past two decades and was 
likely to continue to increase. 
I. They arc Black Hills Trucking; Duanc Hall 
Trucking, D E Casada Rig & Construction Con-
tractor; Hay Hot Oil, Inc.; Liquid Transport; 
Matador Services; Sunco Trucking Co.; and 
Target Trucking, Inc. 
The protestants sought to establish that 
no need existed for additional service in 
northeastern and central Utah. Their evi-
dence indicated that they were able and 
willing to provide additional service to the 
shippers located in the areas Big K pro-
posed to serve, that their equipment for 
transporting oil drilling fluids was under-
utilized, and that they had not refused ser-
vice to any shipper. 
In a two-to-one decision, with Commis-
sioner David Irvine concurnng and dissent-
ing, the Commission held that Big K met 
the requisite fitness criteria to qualify for a 
certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity. Specifically, Big K was found to be 
financially stable; its prior operations were 
in compliance with the various regulatory 
provisions of the law, and its operational 
capabilities were sufficient to enable it to 
perform the proposed service. The Com-
mission also ruled, however, that there was 
no public need for the additional service. 
The Commission stated: 
We now turn to the second require-
ment, public need for the proposed ser-
vice. This requirement normally causes 
new applicants the most trouble. It puts 
a considerable burden on an applicant 
because, if the proposed service dupli-
cates that existing, we have consistently 
held that an applicant must show either 
deficiencies in the existing service (some-
thing more than sporadic, de minimis 
failures), or a prospective growth in the 
market sufficiently substantial to justify 
additional service 
What may be loosely termed the "defi-
ciency in service" requirement does af-
ford existing carriers considerable pro-
tection from increased competition. It 
also protects their investment in operat-
ing rights, which may be substantial. 
In addition, the Commission found that 
"drilling activity in Utah will likely contin-
ue to increase, [and the] potential need for 
additional service of the type sought in the 
2. One earner has its main terminal in San Juan 
County, in the southeastern corner of the state. 
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application [and] the present and immedi-
ately foreseeable level of activity" did not 
indicate a need for additional service. The 
Commission also found that the equipment 
of the protestants was under-utilized and 
that they had not refused to service the 
shipping public. The Commission conclud-
ed that Big K had failed to show a public 
need for the proposed service because 
there was no "deficiency of service." 
Commissioner Irvine concurred in the 
findings and conclusion that Big K met the 
fitness criteria, but dissented on the stan-
dard to be applied in determining public 
need. In his view, the majority miscon-
strued this Courts holding in Lake Shore 
Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 
Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958). Specifi-
cally, he disagreed with the majority that 
Lake Shore required a finding of a "defi-
ciency of service," at least as the Commis-
sion construed that term, before the Com-
mission could grant new authority. He 
contended that a deficiency of service was 
only one factor among several to be 
weighed in determining whether public con-
venience and necessity required the autho-
rization of new service. 
II. 
[1-4] It is axiomatic that we accord the 
ruling of the Public Service Commission 
differing degrees of deference according to 
the nature of the issue reviewed. Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, Utah, 658 
P.2d 601, 608-09 (1983). With respect to 
factual issues, the scope of our inquiry is 
whether the findings are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. We will not reweigh con-
flicting evidence. It is our duty to deter-
mine only whether there is substantial evi-
dence to support a finding. See id. at 
608-09; Harry L Young & Sons, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission, Utah, 672 
P.2d 728, 729 (1983). In determining 
whether the Commission correctly con-
strued general principles of law, whether 
statutory or case law, we generally do not 
defer to the Commission. Utah Depart-
ment of Administrative Services v. Public 
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Service Commission, Utah, 658 P.2d 601, 
608 (1983); Utah Light & Traction Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 
118 P.2d 683 (1941); Mulcahy v. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 
P.2d 298 (1941). Cf Trotta v. Department 
of Employment Security, Utah, 664 P.2d 
1195,1198 (1983). Even with respect to the 
Commission's construction of its organic 
statute, we do not defer unless the Com-
mission by virtue of expertise and experi-
ence with the regulatory scheme is in a 
superior position to give effect to the regu-
latory objectives to be achieved or the 
t^rms of the statute make clear that the 
Commission was intended to have broad 
discretion in construing those terms. Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Department of Em-
ployment Security, Utah, 657 P.2d 1312, 
1316 (1982). 
In reviewing the Commission's applica-
tion of the "deficiency of service" test in 
the motor carrier industry, we are con-
cerned with the terms of the governing 
statute and our own case law construing 
that statute with respect to the extent to 
which the statute contemplated that regu-
lation rather than competition wTas to be 
relied upon to further the public interest in 
motor common carriage. 
III. 
The Motor Vehicle Act of 1935 subjected 
the motor carrier industry to governmental 
regulation as the primary means of protect-
ing and furthering the public interest.3 
Prior thereto, the policy of the state wras to 
rely upon the forces of competition in a 
free market place, subject to the general 
protection of the antitrust laws, to provide 
reasonable rates and adequate service. 
Und^r the new statutory policy, free entry 
into the market place was displaced by 
entry wholly controlled by the Public Ser-
vice Commission. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-6-5 
empowers the Commission to authorize 
new service by granting a certificate of 
convenience and necessity if the Commis-
sion finds that "the public convenience and 
necessity require the proposed sen'ice or 
any part thereof." "Necessity" means 
3. See Laws of Utah 2935, chapters 65 and 66. 
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"reasonably necessary and not absolutely 
imperative Any service or improve-
ment which is desirable for the public wel-
fare and highly important to the public 
convenience may properly be regarded as 
necessary." Mulcahy v. Public Service 
Commission, 101 Utah 245, 250-51, 117 
P.2d 298, 300-01 (1941). 
The issue in this case is whether the 
public convenience and necessity would be 
served by granting new authority to Big K 
or whether existing carriers should be pro-
tected from that competition. Lake Shore 
Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 
Utah 2d 293, 297, 333 P.2d 1061, 1063 
(1958), set out the following test for deter-
mining whether new common carrier au-
thority should issue: 
Our understanding of the statute is 
that there should be a showing that ex-
isting services are in some measure inad-
equate, or that public need as to the 
potential of business is such that there is 
some reasonable basis in the evidence to 
believe that public convenience and ne-
cessity justify the additional proposed 
service. 
Accord Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission, Utah, 672 
P.2d 728, 730 (1983); PBI Freight Service 
v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 598 
P.2d 1352 (1979); Mulcahy v. Public Ser-
vice Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 
298 (1941). 
[5] In determining whether the public 
interest and necessity are served by addi-
tional service, the Commission must con-
sider numerous factors. It must weigh the 
benefits to be derived from increased com-
petition, such as the potential beneficial 
effect upon rates, customer service, the 
acquisition of equipment more suitable to 
customer needs, the efficient use of equip-
ment, greater responsiveness in meeting 
future shipper needs, and greater efficien-
cy in the use of route structures and inter-
lining arrangements. In Union Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 103 Utah 459, 466, 135 P.2d 915, 918 
(1943), this Court stated that "regulated 
competition is as much within the provi-
sions of [§ 54-6-5] as is regulated monopo-
ly No one can have a vested right to 
be free from competition, to have a monop-
oly against the public/' The role of compe-
tition in motor carrier regulation has been 
long recognized by other courts as well. 
In Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 83, 91, 78 S.Ct. 173, 178, 2 
L.Ed.2d 117 (1957), the United States Su-
preme Court stated a long-standing policy 
applicable to the regulation of motor com-
mon carriers: 
"[N]o carrier is entitled to protection 
from competition in the continuance of a 
service that fails to meet a public need, 
nor, by the same token, should the public 
be deprived of a new and improved ser-
vice because it may divert some traffic 
from other carriers.M 
Cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 67, 86, 64 S.Ct. 370, 380, 88 
L.Ed. 544 (1944) ("the Motor Carrier Act is 
to be administered with an eye to affirma-
tively improving transportation facilities, 
not merely to preserving existing arrange-
ments . . .") . See also Chief Freightlines 
Co., Extension Dallas, Texas, 126 MCC 
794 (1977). "Even where Congress has 
chosen Government regulation as the pri-
mary device for protecting the public inter-
est, a policy of facilitating competitive mar-
ket structure and performance is entitled 
to consideration." Bowman Transporta-
tion, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys-
tem, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 298, 95 S.Ct. 438, 
448, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974). 
[6,7] Of course, the Commission may 
not wholly disregard the effect that addi-
tional competition may have on existing 
carriers. See Lake Shore Motor Coach 
Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 296, 
333 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1958); Salt Lake & 
Utah Railroad Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission, 106 Utah 403, 408, 149 P.2d 
647, 649 (1944); Utah Light & Traction 
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 
Utah 99, 113-15, 118 P.2d 683, 690-91 
(1941). The Commission must not undercut 
the ability of efficiently operated carriers 
to achieve sufficient financial stability so 
that they can provide reliable service, com-
ply with public safety regulations, and con-
form with other business regulatory poli-
cies that further economic development and 
the growth of new industries. See gener-
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nience and necessity. That may be demon-
strated by showing the inadequacy of the 
current service or the need to fulfill in-
creased future demand for motor carrier 
services. E.g., Harry L. Young & Sons, 
Inc., supra; Mulcahy v. Public Service 
Commission, supra. 
[14] Inadequacy of service is, however, 
a broader concept than simply the absence 
of service. Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission, 2 Utah 2d 23, 30, 
268 P.2d 990, 995 (1954). A service may be 
inadequate if it does not meet the reason-
able needs of consignors or consignees. 
"[A] service is not necessarily adequate 
because [a] community can 'get by,' can 
conduct its business without further or ad-
ditional service/' Mulcahy, supra, 101 
Utah at 252,117 P.2d at 301. Thus, "inade-
quacy of service," encompasses both sub-
standard service and service that is subject 
to improvement. Inadequacy of service 
need not necessarily be established by evi-
dence of actual shipper dissatisfaction with 
existing carrier service. 
[15] Uintah Freight Lines v. Public 
Service Commission, 118 Utah 544, 223 
P.2d 408 (1950), is clearly on point. It 
established the proposition that the exist-
ing service may be inadequate simply by 
comparison with improvements offered by 
an applicant's proposed service. The appli-
cant proposed providing common carrier 
service from a terminal in Price, Utah, to 
serve shippers located in eastern Utah. 
Both of the applicant's chief competitors 
had their terminals in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
a considerable distance both in time and 
miles from the shippers to be served. The 
Court sustained the Commission's grant of 
new authority because the applicant could 
"offer shippers in that area service with 
much less delay than . . . carriers which 
[had] their equipment stationed in Salt 
Lake City . . . . " Id. at 551, 223 P.2d at 
411. 
PB1 Freight Sennce v. Public Service 
Commission, Utah, 598 P.2d 1352 (1979), 
also sustained the Commission's grant of 
new authority because the applicant, PBI, 
could provide better service than the certi-
ficated carriers. PBI had more of a type of 
ally Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. 
v. Bennett, supra; Mulcahy v. Public Ser-
vice Commission, supra. Nevertheless, 
the fact that additional competition will di-
vert revenues from existing carriers is not 
a valid reason by itself to justify a denial of 
additional authority. 
[8,9] The ultimate criterion against 
which all relevant factors are to be evaluat-
ed is the "public good and convenience," 
Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission, 106 Utah 403, 
408, 149 P.2d 647, 649 (1944), not the exist-
ing carriers' convenience and necessity. 
See Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. 
Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 120, 339 P.2d 1011, 
1014-15 (1959). Except where market con-
ditions require otherwise, such as where 
markets are too small to support an addi-
tional carrier, or a new carrier seeks to 
"cream" a market to the detriment of other 
carriers or small shippers, competition is 
almost always an affirmative factor in fur-
thering the public convenience and necessi-
ty. 
[10-12] Our construction of the term 
"public convenience and necessity" to fos-
ter competition when feasible is not incon-
sistent with § 54-6-4. That section pro-
vides that the Commission should prevent 
unnecessary duplication of services be-
tween motor common carriers. The section 
was not intended to freeze monopoly or 
tightly oligopolistic markets irrespective of 
the benefits competition may provide. It is 
not the policy of § 54-6-4 to favor auto-
matically the fewest number of carriers 
possible in a given market. Competition 
necessarily always involves duplication of 
services. Duplication of services is not 
"unnecessary" if competition will provide a 
better service or lower rates. Rather, 
§ 54-6-4 was intended to prevent the kind 
of predator}', below-cost competition that 
threatens the adequacy of service and the 
soundness of the transportation industry. 
[13] Obviously, however, the policy of 
the Motor Carrier Act is not unrestrained 
competition. Free market entry is express-
ly foreclosed. Pursuant to § 54-6-5, all 
new entrants must prove that additional 
service is consonant with the public conve-
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equipment needed by the shippers served 
than the protestants and also provided 
through service, while the protestant carri-
ers had to interline with other carriers to 
offer a similar service. Compare Lewis v. 
Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264 
(1966) (quicker service); Lake Shore Motor 
Coach Lines v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 
P.2d 1011 (1959) (new type of service); Un-
ion Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 103 Utah 459, 135 P.2d 915 
(1943) (store door pick up and delivery). 
[16] In the instant case, the evidence 
before the Commission indicated that the 
applicant's proposed service would benefit 
those shippers located in the northern and 
south central regions of the state. The 
long hauls from the terminals of the exist-
ing earners to those shippers result in less 
efficient service and greater expense for 
the shippers in an industry in which time is 
a matter of considerable importance in the 
service rendered. Commissioner Irvine 
noted that the service would "be considera-
bly more convenient to [Summit and Rich 
Counties in northern Utah, western Utah, 
and south central Utah], and service could 
be provided more rapidly when necessary. 
There are few enterprises so costly or more 
illustrative of the maxim 'time is money' 
than is exploration for oil and gas." 
In denying Big K's application, the Com-
mission erred in its failure to properly de-
fine the "inadequacy of service" standard. 
Thus, the Commission's finding that the 
existing service was adequate solely be-
cause no shipper was wholly deprived of 
service was based on an error of law. As a 
consequence, the order of the Commission 
must be set aside and the case remanded 
for the Commission to reevaluate the evi-
dence and make new findings in light of 
this opinion. 
IV. 
[17,18] Big K raises three other issues. 
First, it contends that the Commission 
4. The Commission found: 
8. Drilling activity in the state of Utah has 
expanded consistently during the past 20 
years. In the five-year period from 1976 
through 1981, drilling activity has increased 
statewide some 165%. From 1960 through 
erred in striking the testimony of Michael 
Minder, a petroleum engineer with the 
Utah State Division of Oil, Gas, and Min-
ing, that more water haulers were needed 
in Utah. The opinion had an adequate 
foundation arising from Minder's experi-
ence and expertise in the petroleum indus-
try and was not objectionable on the 
ground that Minder gave it in response to a 
Commissioner's question. It is indeed the 
duty of the Commission to see to it that 
relevant evidence is not ignored. The Com-
mission, though it acts in a quasi-judicial 
function and must be impartial as between 
the parties, need not take a passive stance 
in protecting the public interest. Thus, the 
Commission erred in striking the testimony 
because it was elicited as a result of a 
Commissioner's question. 
[19] Second, the last sentence of § 54-
6-5 provides that the Commission shall not 
grant a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity if it would "be detrimental to 
the best interests of the people of the State 
of Utah." Big K argues that the Commis-
sion erred in not making such a finding. 
We think the Commission did not err. By 
its terms, § 54-6-5 requires the Commis-
sion to find, as a predicate to granting a 
certificate, that the "public convenience 
and necessity require the proposed ser-
vice." That finding must necessarily pre-
clude "the possibility that the granting of 
the application will be 'detrimental to the 
best interests of the people of the state of 
Utah' within the meaning of the statute." 
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, Utah, 672 P.2d 728, 
732 (1983). 
Finally, Big K argues that the Commis-
sion found that a potential need for future 
service exists and that Big K is entitled as 
a matter of law to the requested authority 
to fill that need. That conclusion does not 
necessarily follow.4 Whether Big K or ex-
1981, the Notices of Intent to Drill which have 
been filed with the State increased 720% Ex-
isting carriers have been able to meet the 
increased demand. 
9. The record reflects indications that 
drilling activity in Utah will likely continue to 
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isting carriers Bhould fill future needs de-
pends upon the Commission's determina-
tion of all factors bearing upon the public 
convenience and necessity, including the 
desirable effects that may be produced by 
additional competition. 
Reversed and remanded for further con-
sideration. 
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., and ERNEST 
F. BALDWIN, Jr., District Judge, concur. 
HALL, CJ., having disqualified himself, 
does not participate herein; BALDWIN, 
District Judge, sat. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate. 
(o |«YNU*«tSYST|M> 
KUTV, INC., a Nevada corporation, and 
Karl Idsvoog, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
an agency of the State of Utah; Dr. 
Waiter Talbot, Utah State Superintend-
ent of Public Instruction; Board of Ed-
ucation of the Box Elder School Dis-
trict, a body corporate of the State of 
Utah; Morgan Hawkes, Superintendent 
of the Box Elder School District, De-
fendants and Respondents. 
No. 18799. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 12, 1984. 
State Board of Education elicited infor-
mation concerning alleged discrimination in 
school district by means of questionnaires, 
and subsequently released summary of sur-
vey results. When Board refused to re-
lease actual completed questionnaires, re-
porter brought action to obtain disclosure. 
increase. The Overthrust Belt, which extends 
the length of the State, is one of the most 
promising areas for the drilling of hydrocar-
bons in the United States. Onl> 10% of the 
Overthrust Belt has been explored for hydro-
carbons, and it is possible a major find in 
Utah could cause an explosive growth in drill-
STATE BD. OF EDUC. Utah 1357 
13S7 (Utah 1984) 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Philip R. Fishier, J., entered summary 
judgment in favor of Board, and reporter 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., 
held that: (1) questionnaires were not sub-
ject to disclosure under Archives and 
Records Service and Information Practices 
Act, but (2) questionnaires were public 
records under Public and Private Writings 
Act, and case was properly remanded for in 
camera inspection of questionnaires, which 
were to be released unless trial court found 
that it was impossible to edit questionnaire 
responses to preserve confidentiality 
and/or that release of documents would be 
contrary to public interest. 
Remanded. 
Howe, J., dissented and filed state-
ment. 
1. Records e=>54 
Questionnaires which had gathered in-
formation concerning alleged discrimina-
tion in school district pursuant to State 
Board of Education survey were not ''data 
on individuals" to be kept on "permanent 
or semi-permanent basis," and thus were 
not subject to disclosure under Archives 
and Records Service and Information Prac-
tices Act. U.C.A. 1953, 63-2-61(9). 
2. Records <s=*50 
Policy reflected in Utah Public and Pri-
vate Writings Act is that records be kept 
open for public inspection in order to pre-
vent secrecy in public affairs, but rights 
created by Act are not absolute, and are 
subject to implied rule of reason. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-26-2. 
3. Records <s=>64 
Breach of promise of confidentiality 
standing alone is not of sufficient harm to 
public interest to prevent disclosure of pub-
lic records under Public and Private Writ-
ing activity. There are thus indications of a 
potential need for additional service of the 
type sought in this application. The evidence 
in this case is, however, that the present and 
immediate!) foreseeable level of actmt> does 
not so indicate. 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Applica-
tion Of SPREADER SPECIALISTS, 
INC., for Authority to Operate 
as a Motor Carrier of Property 
in Intrastate Commerce. 
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Scott M. Matheson 
James M. Elegante 
Thomas M. Zarr 
Robert L. Stevens 
Brian W. Burnett, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
ISSUED: November 5, 1935 
For Spreader Specialists, 
Inc., Applicant 
" W. S. Hatch Company, 
Protestant 
" Matlack, Inc., Energy 
Express, Inc., Clark 
Tank Lines, Inc., 
Protestants 
w
 Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State of Utah, Intervener 
By the Commission: 
Following the Commission's Report and Order in this 
matter, issued April 12, 1995, Spreader Specialists, Inc., 
hereafter called •'Applicant", filed its Petition for Reconsid-
eration and Reversal May 2, 1985. Memoranda were filed and the 
matter argued August 6, 1985 and September 24, 1985. The Commis-
sion, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the follow-
ing Discussion, Conclusions of Law, and the Order based thereon. 
DISCUSSION AMD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. At the time this case was heard, the decision 
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the Supreme Court of Utah in Big K Corporation vs. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, 689 P.?d 1349 (1984* had not been issued. 
However, the Commission is necessarily concerned with the poten-
tial impact of that decision on our response to the Applicant's 
Petition for Reconsideration and Reversal. Our reading of the 
Court's decision does not impel us to the conclusion that the 
Court has mandated a de facto deregulation of the transportation 
industry based on a presumption that competition necessarily 
serves the public interest. Rather, it appears to us, and the 
parties apparently share our view, that the Court established a 
balancing test for the grant of authority, in which the public 
benefits to be anticipated from increased competition are impor-
tant factors for us to consider, but are not per se dispositive. 
Against the prospective benefits must be weighed the prospective 
detriment. One facet of that detriment would be the impairment 
of the ability of efficiently-run carriers to maintain their 
service at existing levels of performance and safety. Of neces-
sity, since we are dealing with possible future events, findings 
in regard to such impairment must be speculative. For the same 
reason, findings regarding potential benefits must be likewise 
speculative. 
2. Applicant argues that in light of the Big K deci-
sion, we should abandon a strict quasi-judicial approach to 
deciding authority applications and substitute a quasi-
legislative approach. We are not clear how the two would differ 
in this context, since a necessarily speculative balancing 
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of factors is mandated by the Court, irrespective of how—quasi-
judicial or quasi-legislative—that balancing is characterized. 
If Applicant is arguing that Big K establishes a presumption in 
favor of an applicant, we do not so read the opinion. Certainly 
the Court did not overrule any of its prior pronouncements on 
this issue, and indeed it cited several of them with apparent 
approval. 
3. In reviewing the record of this case, we are not 
persuaded that the Administrative Law Judge erred in his percep-
tion of the facts and the public interest. It is our conclusion 
that he properly balanced the merits and demerits of additional 
competition and we specifically reaffirm his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and his Order based thereon. 
4. If we are to give an applicant for authority 
greater consideration than this, we believe we need clearer 
direction from the Court or the Legislature. Applicant's 
petition for reversal must be dismissed. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Petition 
of Spreader Specialists, Inc., for reconsideration and reversal 
be, and the same hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day o' 
November, 1985. 
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I si 3rent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) /si James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Is! Brian T. Stewarts Commissioner 
Attest: 
Is! Georgia B. Peterson 
Executive Secretary 
COMMISSION COMMENTS 
The Commission must base its decisions on statutory 
construction as guided by a long string of court decisions of 
which the Big K decision is but the most recent. There are those 
who interpret the Big K decision as a major change in the 
regulation of the common carrier industry in Utah, which will 
dramatically reduce restrictions on market entry in future cases. 
We do not believe that Big K has wrought such a chang2. 
Fundamental changes in regulation of utilities including motor 
transport, should come from the Legislature or from the Supreme 
Court with a clear invalidation of prior statutory construction. 
We are aware of the current efforts within the 
Legislature to study the transportation industry and consider 
legislation with a deregulatory flavor. The Commission will 
support such legislative efforts with any assistance or 
information requested. 
• BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In t>c natter of the the Appli- ) 
cation Of SPREADER SPECIALISTS, ) 
INC., for Authority to Operate ) 
as a Motor Carrier of Property ) 
in* Intrastate Commerce. ) 
CASE NO. 84-663-0: 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Appearances: 
James M. Elegante 
and Michael L. Larsen 
Thomas M. Zarr 
Robert L. Stevens 
ISSUED: April 12, 
For Spreader Specialists, 
Applicant 
K. S. Hatch Co. , 
Protestant 
Matlack, Inc.; 
Energy Express, Inc.; 
Clark Tank Lines, Inc., 
Protestants 
Mark L. Moench 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division of Public Util: 
Department of Business 
Peculation, State of Ut; 
t i e s 
r\?e>A h.\r r s O a r\ n — i * v ^ * C a 1 1 C r. , 
By the Commission: 
Pursuant to notice duly se v d by mail nd pub 
the dbove-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing the :••::. 
da" cf July, 1224, befcre A. Robert Thurman, Administrative La-.; 
Judge for the Commission, at the Commission Offices, 16 0 East 3?: 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Additional evidence v;as ta':er. the 
following days through July 20, 1984, and on August 1, 2, 3, ~r.~ 
7, 1984. Simultaneous briefs were tendered, and the matter 
submitted, October 3, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge, having 
been fully advised in the premises, now enters the follcv:ing 
Appendix "C" 
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He;vt containing recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law. ?~d the Order based thereon. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Spreader Specialists, Inc., hereafter called 
"Applicant", is an Idaho corporation, qualified to do business in 
the State of Utah, and having its principal place of business at 
Korth Salt Lake, Utah. Applicant presently holds no authority 
from this Commission. However, Applicant has leased its equip-
ment, complete with drivers, to Utah certificated carriers since 
1976, and it has so operated in Utah. Applicant has most recent-
ly leased to Matlack, Inc., (hereafter called "Matlack"), a 
protestant herein. Applicant does hold authority from the Idaho 
Public Service Commission to operate as a common carrier by motor 
vshicle transporting liquid petroleum and petroleum products 
between all points in that state. Applicant also has authority 
from the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to transport 
petroleum and petroleum products, and non-petroleum bulk liquid 
-".•edicts used in road construction, between points in Montana, 
/Jycm.ir.g, Utah, Arizona, Tew Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, 
C'lcrado, California, Idaho, Nevada, Washington and Oregon. 
2. Applicant originally sought authority to transport 
"petroleum and petroleum products, and such commodities as are 
used in road construction over irregular routes from and between 
all points and places in the State of Utah." The application was 
subsequently amended, *and the amended application seeks authority 
to operate "as a common carrier by motor vehicle for the 
-3-
transportation of liquid petroleum and liquid petroleum products 
(except propane and butane), in bulk, in tank vehicles over 
irregular routes from and between all points and places in the 
State of Utah," 
3. The application is opposed by Katlack; W. S. Hatch 
Company, (hereafter called "Hatchco"); Clark Tank Lines, Inc. 
(hereafter called "Clark"); and Energy Express, Inc. (hereafter 
called "Energy"). All of the protestants are certificated by 
this Commission and hold authority which conflicts, in varying 
degrees, with that sought by Applicant. 
4. Applicant operates a fleet of 22 tank trucks and 
tank trailers capable of hauling liquid petroleum and petroleum 
products. Nine of the truck and trailer combinatiens are spe-
cially equipped with modern asphalt spreading devices and tv:c cf 
the truck and trailer combinations are specially equipped fcr 
transporting refined petroleum products. The remaining equip-
ment, as well as the spreader-equipped trucks (to some extents 
may be used for transporting various types of liquid pet:r:leu~ 
products. Applicant maintains its equipment in good operating 
condition. Applicnt represents it will file insurance certifi-
cates, annual reports, and it will publish tariffs as required by 
law and it will use qualified, skilled and licensed drivers in 
its operations. It maintains a safety and driver training 
program and will continue to do so if its application is crar.ted. 
Ey virtue of its operations under its Idaho and ICC authority, as 
well as its activities as equipment lessor to Utah-certificated 
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c.iers, Applicant has acquired experience and expertise in the 
car;.>ge of commodities for which it seeks authority. Accord-
ingly, it is fit operationally. 
5. Protestants have raised some question as to Appli-
cant's regulatory fitness, but we find no evidence of bad faith 
or willful violation of applicable statute or rule and do not 
find Applicant disqualified on grounds of regulatory fitness. 
6. The authority Applicant seeks would involve render-
ing four distinct, though related, types of service, viz trans-
porting liquid asphalt, distributing the same at job sites, 
transporting crude petroleum for well sites to refineries, and 
transporting refined products (distillates) from refineries to 
customers. 
7. To this point, as implies in Applicant's corporate 
name, Applicant has devoted most of its time and resources to 
presiding asphalt transportation and spreading service. The 
spreading operation is distinct from the transportation, involves 
a --ostantial degree of skill and training by the operator, and 
r-?^ u;res specialized equipment. Spreading as such, is not 
subj3-t to Commission regulation; however, to attempt to provide 
a spreading service without the concomitant transportation 
revenue would be cost prohibitive. The spreading equipment, 'once 
installed, cuts down the payload a tanker would otherwise be able 
to haul, makes the rig more prone to damage and wear, and other-
wise renders its use in other than spreading operations less than 
desirable on economic grounds. Furthermore, the season in which 
•5-
sucr equipment receives substantial use in Utah normally extends, 
at r.c£t, from May through October, with the peak months being 
July, August, and September. The spreader equipment is costly, 
and its acquisition is not economically justified unless it can 
be fully utilized during the season. 
8, Owing to this seasonality of spreader demand, 
Applicant has, historically, gone through an annual "boom and 
bustM cycle in which, if it is to survive, it has had to accrue 
substantially its entire revenues during the summer season and 
dissipate the same to keep the firm in existence the rest of the 
year. In the course of its operations, however, Applicant has 
won considerable customer loyalty, and despite the seasonality 
handicap has been profitable, marginally, for all but two years. 
The presentation of Applicant's financial .data at the hearing was 
somewhat complicated by Applicant's use of a cash, rather than 
accrual, accounting method. Nevertheless, we find adequate data 
was presented, and the results of our analysis of the same are 
contained in Exhibits A and B annexed hereto and incorporated by 
this reference. Though the balance sheet in Exhibit B shrvs a 
questionable Hquick" ratio, for the reasons set forth hereafter, 
we do not find Applicant financially unfit. 
9. A precipitating factor in Applicant's deciricr tc 
seek authority was a change in the terms under which Matlack 
proposed to lease Applicant's equipment. Matlack recently 
purchased its intranstate Utah authority from Pacific Interr.cun-
tain Express (PIE). Applicant had been leasing its equipment to 
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Pir and continued the arrangement when Matlack acquired the 
aut;.rity. Under the terms of the PIE lease, PIE retained 11 
percent of the revenues generated by Applicant's equipment and 
remitted the rest as lease payments. Matlack proposed to raise 
the retained percentage to 13 percent. PIE, and later Matlack, 
did, in exchange for the retained percentage, perform other 
services in addition to allowing Applicant to operate under the 
aegis of their authority. The services included billing, col-
lection, safety instruction, and like overhead items. Matlack 
claims it also includes marketing services for its lessors, but 
at least as far as asphalt spreading and hauling is concerned, 
the major marketing burden has fallen on Applicant's shoulders, 
and it appears to have borne it with substantial success. 
Matlack discontinued the safety program for its lessors. 
10. Protestants have argued that, taking into consid-
eration the services performed by Matlack, it would cost Appli-
cant more to operate independently than it would even under the 
1? percent lease arrangement. After a careful reading of Appli-
cant's testimony and Protestants' Exhibit 16, we disagree. It 
vrculi clearly be to the Applicant's advantage to have its own 
authority. Further, Applicant's pro forma operating statement, 
as we have constructed it in Exhibit A, annexed hereto, indicates 
Applicant should enjoy a comfortable operating ratio in its 
operations. Accordingly, we conclude that Applicant is in a 
reasonable, though not exceptionally strong, position operation-
ally. Accordingly, we find Applicant financially fit. 
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11. A second factor inducing Applicant to seek its own 
authrrity is the very seasonality of its primary business. With 
its spreader equipment of necessity idle much of the year, it 
would ease Applicant's financial problems substantially if it 
could use its transport equipment to a greater extent the rest of 
the year. One barrier to its so doing is the fact that it would 
be competing with its own leases, which is very active in the 
petroleum-hauling market. Although Matlack does have two spreader 
equipped rigs stationed in Utah, spreading service as such, ar.d 
for that natter asphalt transportation, is not a major part cf 
its operations. It appears that as a consequence, Matlack has 
been willing to let Applicant pretty much develop the asphalt 
business on its own. Whether Matlack would be equally complacent 
in regard to other types of carriage is questionable. 
12. The application was supported by the testimony cf 
15 witnesses, of whom nine were interested in asphalt service. 
Of the six remaining witnesses, four were concerned with trans-
portation of crude petroleum, and the last two with the trar.spcr-
tation of distillates. One of the witnesses with a primary 
interest in the asphalt transportation does ajsc have a limited 
interest in distillate transportation, since his firm uses 
naphtha, a petroleum distillate, as a raw material. An addi-
tional substantial number of certificates of support were filed 
with or shortly after application. 
13. The primary complaint of the witnesses testifying 
in support of asphalt authority was difficulty in getting spreader-
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e.~.::-red rigs on a job site on short notice during the busy 
sea:-... Coupled with this in several cases was a concern that an 
upswing in state road maintenance activities, necessitated by bad 
weather and flooding over recent years, would aggravate the 
problem. Seven of the nine witnesses had not attempted to use 
all of the carriers now available to them. Some of the witnesses 
explained this on the basis that their business had not been 
solicited by anyone but Applicant. 
14. Only two witnesses testified in regard to distil-
late transportation. Cne complained of consistently late deliv-
eries; however, it transpired that his firm was taking advantage 
of a tariffed rate offering a lower rate in exchange for delivery 
at the carrier's convenience. The witness said further, his firm 
wojld continue to avail itself of the lower rate even if the 
application were granted. The other witness, testifying for a 
major oil company complained of sore delivery and loading prob-
lems, including delays and pick-up and delivery of the wrong 
pi-- luct. The failure rate for a short test period immediately 
prior to the hearing, however, appears to have been less than two 
percent. 
15. In regard to crude petroleum transportation, three 
firms testified, one presenting two witnesses. The first of 
these has experienced no problems, and his firm has not availed 
itself fully of the service no available. His only concern was 
that as many carriers as possible be available to him. The 
second firm complained of a lack of carrier cooperation in 
9-
acceding to a request to install safety rails on the tops of tank 
trailers and of having to scramble to meet emergency transporta-
tion requirements when the pipeline from the Uintah Basin to 
North Salt Lake is down. The common carriers explained, however, 
that installation of the rails would make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to load or unload their equipment at other customers1 
facilities. In regard to the pipeline problem, the witness 
conceded that the carriers had worked to alleviate the problem, 
and the witness could not cite any real failure in service. 
16. The most serious service complaint came frcm the 
witness for a major oil company in regard to crude petroleum 
transportation. His firm buys from a number of producers in 
Summit County, and some of the wells concerned fluctuate substan-
tially in the rate at which they produce. Since the cr.-site 
storage is limited, the crude must at times be hauled en shert 
notice to avoid shutting in the well. To compound the prcrler., 
it is not feasible to use trucks from two or mere carriers—one 
carrier must send frcm two to four trucks. Several service 
failures have occurred, most notably on weekends when the wit-
ness's firm's own fleet operations are substantially curtailed, 
owing to difficulty in finding competent drivers to wcrk t:.:se 
shifts. The existing common carriers have similar problems en 
weekends. 
17. The witness's company operates a substantial 
proprietary fleet and tenders business to common carriers when 
its own fleet is operating at capacity or its trucks lack proper 
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p-- • ? to serve certain wells. Two of the existing carriers have 
cff;.*-=d the witness's company a dedicated equipment arrangement 
as a means of solving the problem, but the witness1s company has 
a policy of not entering into such arrangements. 
18. The only way the witness's demand could be met 
would be for the corjr.cn carriers to have two or more pieces of 
equipment, with drivers, ready for instant response to a call 
that might or might not come. This does not strike • us as an 
economic proposition for any carrier, including the Applicant. 
Moreover, given the size of Applicant's fleet, and its primary 
interest in asphalt carriage and spreading, we are unable to see 
how granting the application could help the shipper's problem at 
all during the peak spreading season. In any event, so long as 
Ac-"leant continues to lease to Matlack, the shipper may call 
Applicant for service. 
19. The present Utah rate structure for the service for 
v:hi~h the authority is sought is competitive, as noted by one of 
tr.j supporting shippers, which is even cutting back on its own 
rr:-rrietary fleet operations in light of that rate structure. 
Applicant dees not propose to operate at r^ates below those 
effered by the existing carriers. 
20. Of the existing carriers, Matlack is the strongest 
financially, it is a very large interstate carrier with a net 
worth of $28,000,000, endowing it with ample resources to expand 
its Utah fleet as market demand dictates. Ninety percent of its 
Utah operations are conducted under its intra-state authority, 
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ar.ci for the year prior to the hearing, those operations v:ere 
concreted at a loss. Accordingly, Matlack does not perceive the 
need for additional equipment in the Utah market at present. It 
is willing to continue to use Applicant's equipment as lessee cf 
the same. Should the lease end, Matlack is capable of, though it 
made no representation regarding, replacing Applicant's equipment 
in the Utah market with its own. The impact on Matlack cf 
granting the application would be two-fold. First, it would 
immediately lose the profit it derives from Applicant's activ-
ities, which, Matlack computes, approximates three percent of the 
revenue Applicant's equipment generates. In terms of Matlack's 
overall revenues, this strikes us as negligible. Second, in the 
longer term, Matlack would face increased cor.petiticn in the 
crude and distillate hauling markets and very possibly scr.e 
diversion of revenue, the extent of which is impossible tc 
quantify. 
21. Energy is a Utah-based carrier, holding both ir.ter-
BrS- intra-state authority. Approximately 40 percent cf its 
revenues are generated through its Utah intra-state operaticr.s. 
It operated at a loss the year prior to the hearing. All cf its 
Utah intra-state revenues would be subject to civersicr. by 
granting the application. How much diversion wculd actually 
eventuate is, of course, impossible to say. 
22. Clark is likewise a Utah-based carrier holding both 
inter- and intra-state authority. Approximately 30 percer.t cf 
its revenue derives from its intra-state operations. Clark has 
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o:::*-ted at a loss for the five ye£.rs prior to the hearing, and 
it •••-? undertaking a substantial retrenchment, including an 
attempt to negotiate a 10 percent payroll reduction. Approxi-
mately 85 percent of Clark's intra-state revenues would be 
subject to diversion by granting the application; how much actual 
diversion there would be is again impossible to say. 
23. Hatchco is a Utah-based carrier, operating both 
inter- and intra-state, and maintaining terminals at Woods Cross, 
Geneva, Roosevelt, Vernal, Delta, Salina, and Huntington. During 
1983, Hatchco derived earnings of approximately 7.49 million 
cellars from its Utah operations, on which a net prcfit of 
approximately 24 thousand dollars was realized. Owing to a 
declining transportation market in the coal, uranium, and chemi-
ca
m
. fields, Hatchco operated at a loss . for the first half of 
19-.4. Approximately 1.12 million cellars cr Hatchco revenue is 
pcr^ntially divertible by granting the application. 
24. Matlack, Clark, and Hatchco all possess and operate 
sr.^sder equipment adequate to the spreading task. 7.11 have 
f/perienced excess equipment capacity during 1983, even in the 
use :f their spreader equipment. Energy likewise has experienced 
excess capacity in its transportation equipment. 
25. In the markets involved here, there is no interlin-
ing, and there are no significant back hauls available. Accord-
ingly, granting of the certificate is likely to exacerbate, 
rather than alleviate, inefficient equipment use. 
26. Applicant presented some evidence intended to 
indicate a prospective growth in the markets involved. In the 
case of asphalt hauls, the evidence indicates a market decline, 
since the major sources of asphalt now appear to exist out of 
state in contrast with the situation a few years ago. Giving 
Applicant the maximum benefit of its evidence on growth, the 
growth indicated appears insufficient to justify by itself the 
granting of the application. 
27. The Division of Public Utilities did not oppose the 
application. 
CONCLUSIONS or LAV: 
The statutory burden to be satisfied in connection with 
a common carrier application is set out in Sections 54-6-4 and 
54-S-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953. The governing case law has recently 
been collected in Big K Corporation v. Public Service Comr.issicr., 
Opinion, Case No. 1E643, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984). Our analysis 
proceeds in light of that case and its predecessors collected 
therein. 
Inasmuch as we have not found Applicant disqualified cr. 
fitness grounds, we must proceed to consider "convenience and 
necessity", taking into consideration the factors listed by the 
Court in the Big K decision. Among the factors listed by the 
Court are: 
. . . the benefits to be derived from in-
creased competition, such as the potential 
beneficial effect upon rates, customer 
service, the acquisition of equipment more 
suitable to customer needs, the efficient use 
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of equipment, greater responsiveness in 
meeting future shipper needs, and greater 
efficiency in the use of route structures and 
interlining arrangements. Opinion, Case No. 
18643, at 5. 
We are cautioned, however, that: 
The Commission must not undercut the ability 
of efficiently operated carriers to achieve 
sufficient financial stability so that they 
can provide reliable service, comply with 
public safety regulations, and conform with 
other business regulatory policies that 
further economic development and the growth 
of new industries. id. at 6. 
At the outset we note that the supporting shippers, 
individually and collectively, have failed to avail themselves 
fully of the service now available. Though there have been, 
apparently, seme service problems, with the exception of one 
shipper's crude hauls, they appear to have been minimal, and en 
z:e vhole the existing service appears to be adequate and respon-
sive to the reasonable demands put on it. We are unable tc 
perreive that the granting of the application would contribute tc 
*•>.-=. solution of meeting a peak demand so seriously in excess of 
v.e .rough, in the case of asphalt spreading, or in meeting the 
erer-ency needs of one shipper with unusual requirements. 
We have examined the evidence with respect to any 
substantial benefits to be derived from increased competition and 
the beneficial effects, if any, on rates, should the application 
be granted. Given that there are already four serious competi-
tors in the relevant markets, and rates are already so low that 
all four have either suffered a loss, or a minimal profit, in 
their Utah operations, no rate benefit is to be anticipated. 
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Givcr that the fleets of the existing carriers are underutilized, 
no service benefit is to be anticipated, whether by way of 
additional equipment acquisition or otherwise; on the contrary, 
the necessity of retrenchment is likely to lead to decline in 
service. As indicated by Finding No. 25, above, no benefit by 
way of interlining or improved use of route structure is to be 
anticipated. 
We have examined the evidence with a view to determin-
ing whether the grant of authority would undercut the ability of 
efficiently operated carriers to achieve sufficient financial 
stability to allow them to provide reliable service. We find it 
noteworthy that all four existing carriers find their Utah 
operations marginally profitable at best, and seriously unprofit-
able at worst. This, despite years of . collective experience. 
While we are loathe to conclude Applicant's entry into the market 
would so financially impair the existing carriers that they wculc 
fine themselves under pressure to cut corners on safety require-
ments, we cannot blind ourselves to economic realities anc the 
real possibility of such occurring. 
We must also consider that particularly the markets 
relevant here involve transportation to remote parts of the 
state. It would be unfortunate indeed if Applicant's entry into 
the market precipitated the closure of any of the existing 
carriers1 terminals or the curtailment of their operations into 
those areas. Indeed this risk of deterioration of service into 
remore parts of the state strongly distinguishes this case from 
CASE NO. 84-663-01 
-16-
t: .\ presented in Big K in which the applicant proposed to open a 
ter.i'ai in an area not then served by such a facility. Id. at 
«• • 
As our Findings above recognize, we cannot quantify the 
likely diversion of revenue from any one carrier. However, since 
all four have experienced lossed in their Utah intra-state 
operations, there is a substantial danger we are dealing with the 
straw capable of breaking the camel's back. Kith little or no 
offsetting benefit in prospect, we choose not to run that risk. 
7c put a fourth financially weak carrier in a market now occupied 
by three weak carriers and a strong one appears to us to be a 
recipe for curtailing competition in the long run, rather than 
boosting it. 
There is one unique aspect of this case, pointed out by 
Applicant, which merits discussion. Owing to its long associa-
tic.". with first PIE and latterly Katlack, Applicant is in fact 
par. of the existing transportation facilities, at lease insofar 
a? -sphalt transportation and spreading is concerned. However, 
; t- c:es net follow that Applicant is in any different posture 
-han ether seekers of authority. Applicant must still meet its 
statutory burden. Applicant's past operations as lessor may be 
considered, as they have been, for demonstrating experience and 
ability, but to accord them more than that would put in jeopardy 
the long-standing practice of owner-operator leasing, as well as 
open a large loophole in the regulatory scheme. It may be true 
that Applicant's withdrawal from the Utah market would leave a 
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hclcr we are satisfied, however, that the existing carriers are 
cap:r2e of filling it. 
Were the Utah operations of the existing carriers 
financially sounder, or were we convinced Applicant's entry into 
the market would offer the shipping public real benefit, we would 
be inclined to grant the application. However, on this record, 
we conclude the application must be denied. 
ORDER 
NOV:, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Applica-
tion of Spreader Specialists be, and the same hereby is, denied. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of April, 
1985. 
/s/A. Robert Thurman 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 12th day cf April, 19E! , as 
the Report and Order of the Commission. 
/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
/s/ James K. Byrne, Commissioner 
(SEAL) /s/ Brian T. Stewart 
Commissioner Pro Tempore 
Attest: 
/s/ Georgia B. Peterson 
Executive Secretary 
Exhibit A 
rONST^UCTED OPERATING STATEMENT, SPREADER SPECIALISTS 


















Petal Incone 735996.52 854515.52 
:?E~ATI':3 EXPENSES 
Cr*ice Expese 354.90 
Advertising 1D23.B2 
~ersirs 52206.00 
Travel Expense 5921.20 
Licenses, fees £ permits 2549.43 
Lerai Z Accounting 2975.50 
Saia-ies C wages, gross 230161.E7 
°ayrcii Taxes 23587.49 
Utah *ees £ taxes 
Subcontracts 1527.17 
Ti-es 0 '..neels 14458.34 
"iscellaneous Expense 250.74 
I-S'-r---:e Expense 7529.85 
F?-T- . . 14781.57 
C.i. 7 jel 1473S3.81 
lecrec.ation 55707.5G 
-".iii-.es 0 telephone 3337.14 











































Cash on Deposit 11D5e.12 
Accounts Receivable 13ES34.95 
Total Current Assets 147652.07 
FIXED ASSETS 
Equipment 11EC357.7E 
Less: Accumulated Depreciation [ E1CEC1.C1) 
Total Fixed Assets 3555E5.11 
Totcl Assets 5CD24E-.1E 
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 
CLIENT LIABILITIES 
Notes Payable—Bank Loans E3DDD.0D 
Notes Psy£rle--Dther 1C3DD.DC 
Payroll Taxes Deducted CC57.CC 
Accounts Payable S7cEC.CD 
Total Current Liabilities 171E77.5£ 
•'^  TE-1' LIABILITIES 
J^ctes Payable 1CCSEC.CC 
Loans fro- Stockholders 1CCC7E.CC 
TotEl Lcnr-terr Liabilities 2C1CSC.CC 
Total Liabilities C331C2.SE 
EC: :TY 
Cccitel Etock outstanding 13CCC.DC 
^eteiner Earnings (deficit) ECC^C.EC 
TCTAL ECJJTY 7CICC.C: 
Total Liabilities £ Equity 5D32C9.15 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
J hereby certify that the foregoing consisting of 17 pages numbere: 
1 to 17 inclusive, is a true and correct copy of the original 
REPORT AND ORDER, CASE NO. 84--663-01 
Application of SPREADER SPECIALISTS, 
Operate as 
Commerce. 









in the foregoing entitled matter or cause, now of record or on file in the 
office of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
ZN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 











Clark Tfenk Lines 
Biergy express 
Natlack 




Gross Revenue Prom Applicable 
Intrastate Commodities 
1983 1983 
$ 2,738,132 $ 2,409,556 (A) 
$ 2,142,614 $ 2,142,614 (B) 
$ 2,700,000 $ 2,565,000 (C) 
$ 7,488,647 $ 1,122,081 (D) 
$ 15,069,393 $ 8,239,251 
Revenue Subject to 
Diversion in Order 





















Reach 1984 Revenue 
Projection (assuming 






Spreader Specialists $ 503,024 $ 503,024 (E) $ 650,000 (P) 













A. Based on Testimony of Craig Maddux; ($2,738,132) x (88% - percentage ot revenue derived from commodities covered in Application)* 
$2,409,556.10. 
B. Based on Testimony of Eddie Brinkerhoff that "all of Energy Express' intrastate revenue could be diverted- by Applicant. 
C. Based on Testimony of Prank DeSantis; ($3,000,000 Utah terminal revenue) x (90% intrastate) x (95% petroleum) » $2,565,000 
D. Baaed on Exhibits 58 and 62. 
E. Based on Testimony of Leo Ttiurston and Guy Wilkins and Exhibits 8 and 9; Represents revenue after lease payment to Kitlack 
($1,006,048x50%). 
P. Based on "testimony of Guy Wilkins and Exhibit 9; Represents projected revenue assuming Application is granted and lease payments no 
longer made. 
G. Based on assumption that all of Spreader Specialists' increased revenue would be diverted from protestants as opposed to contract 
carriers, proprietary fleets, contractors, governmental bodies, etc. Revenue diverted from protestants would be less if projected 
growth is spread over the entire market fleet. 
Protestant 
Clark Tank Lines 
Energy Express 
Matlack 
W.S. Hatch Ob. 
Subtotal 
Gross Revenue 
Gross Revenue Prom Applicable 
Intrastate commodities 
1983 1983 
S 2,738,132 $ 2,409,556 (A) 
$ 2,142,614 $ 2,142,614 (B) 
$ 2,700,000 $ 2,565,000 (C) 
$ 7,488,647 $ 1,122,081 (D) 
$ 15,069,393 $ 8,239,251 
Projected Intrastate 
Revenue for 1984 
Assuming 5% 
Hatket Increase 
$ 2,530,034 (29.2%) 
$ 2,249,745 (26%) 
$ 2,693,250 (31.1%) 
$ 1,178,185 (13.6%) 
$ 8,651,214 (100%) 
% Increase/S Increase 









Revenue Subject to 
Diversion in Order 
for Applicant to 
Reach 1984 Revenue 
Projection (assuming 














$121,704 (G) 1.4 % 
Applicant 
Spreader Specialists $ 503,024 $ 503,024 (E) $ 650,000 (P) 
TOTAIS 115^,51,2^417 i^SjJ42tm27S j 9,301,214 
29.2%/$146,976 S 25,1S1 (H) 
JtUSifitt 
A. Based on Testimony of Craig Maddux; ($2,738,132) x (88% - percentage of revenue derived from commodities covered in Application)* 
$2,409,556.10. 
B. Based on Testimony of Eddie Brinkerhoff that "all of Biergy Express' intrastate revenue could be diverted* by Applicant. 
C. Baaed on Testimony of Prank DeSantis; ($3,000,000 Utah terminal revenue) x (90% intrastate) x (95% petroleum) • $2,565,000 
D. Based on Exhibits 58 and 62. 
E. Based on Testimony of Leo Thurston and Guy Wilkins and Exhibits 8 and 9; Represents revenue after lease payment to Natlack ($1,006,048 x 
50%). 
P. Based on Testimony of Guy Wilkins and Exhibit 9; Represents projected revenue assuming Application is granted and lease payments no 
longer made. 
G. Based on assumption that all of Spreader Specialists' increased revenue would be diverted from protestants as opposed to contract 
carriers, proprietary fleets, contractors, governmental bodies, etc. Revenue diverted from protestants would be less if projected 
growth is spread over the entire market fleet. 
H. Represents increased revenue to Spreader Specialists based on 5% market growth. 
